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PUFENDORF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Charles Covell 
Of the classic writers who are recognized to have contributed to the 
establishing of the modern system of the Iaw of nations， there are 
few whose position in the tradition of international law it is harder 
to be clear about than that of the German jurist and political phiω 
losopher Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94). In one respect， PufEmdorfs 
place in the tradition of international law is central. For the school 
in moral， legal and political thought to which Pufendorf belonged 
was the school of modern secular naturallaw， and the secular natu-
ral law thinkers played a majo1' 1'ole in determining the form and 
substance of much of modern international law. The founde1' of the 
modern secular natu1'al law school is generally held to be the Dutch 
jurist and political theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)， and Grotius 
it is who is widely 1'ega1'ded as the founde1' also of modern interna-
tional law with his seminal works De Jure Praedαe Commentαrius 
(c. 1604) and De Jure BelliαcPαcis Libri Tres (1625). iJl Pufimdorf 
was to bring together many， ifnot al， of Grotius' doctrines in an 
elaborate system of natural law ju1'isp1'udence， which was set out in 
the following works: Elementorum Jurisprudentiαe Universαlis 
Libri Duo (1660); De Jure Nαtur，αιe et Gentium Libri Octo (1672); 
De Officio Hominis et Civis juxtαLegem Nαturalem Libri Duo 
(1673). 121 The system of natu1'al law that Pufendorf expounded 
served to establish the conceptual framework for the classic exposi-
tions of the p1'inciples of the law of nations of the eighteenth cen-
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tury， including the ones provided by the German philosopher Chris-
tian Wolff (1679-1754)， as in his Jus Gentium Methodo Scienti，βcα 
Per・tr，倒的tum(1749)ヲ 1，1and by the Swiss jurist Emer， orEmmerich， 
de Vattel (1714・67)in his Le Droit des Gens， ou Principes de lαLoi 
Naturelle，αppliques a la Conduite et αux Affaires des Nαtions et des 
Souver，αins (1758). 141 
From this it would appear that the claims made for Pufendorf 
as a central fi♂1re in the modern tradition of international law are 
more or less uncontestable. However， itremains the case that for 
al that Pufendorf was the successor肋 Grotiusand for al that he 
looked forward to Wolff and Vattel， there are stil crucial respects in 
which he must be viewed as having failed to establish an adequate 
concept of international law. lndeed， Pufendorf is in certain of his 
concerns to be placed together with the English political philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)， and Hobbes， itshould be noted， isgen-
erally reckoned to be a writer who denied the reality of interna-
tional law， rather than one who endorsed the claims of law as the 
basis for the regulation of the international order. 1汚l
The concern in the present paper is with detailed discussion of 
the contribution that Pufendorf made to the development of the 
modern tradition of international law， and to the development of 
the concept of law that is specific to this tradition. It is explained 
that Pufendorf sβw what he took to be the first principles of natural 
law as comprising the substance of international law. Thus it is un-
derlined that Pufendorf affirmed the reality of international law， in
the respect that he affirmed that the law of nature had direct appli-
cation to states and rulers in the sphere of their mutual external re-
lations. At the same time， itis explained that the identification that 
Pufendorf made of natural law as the essence of international law 
was such that he eame to fal short of the ful realization of the con-
cept of international law， and this particularly so with respect to 
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the determination of a concept of internationallaw that properly ac-
corded with the status of states and rulers as the subjects of inter-
national law. Despite this， itis stil emphasized that the natural 
law approach that Pufendorf adopted in the understanding of inter-
national law was， and remains， virtuous in that it served to give 
recognition to the first-order principles that lie at the foundations of 
modern internationallaw. The paper comprises four parts. In Part 1， 
Grotius is considered as a writer on international law， and with 
brief reference being made to Hobbes in relation to international 
law. The discussion of Grotius and Hobbes sets the context for the 
exposition in Part 2 of the principles of Pufendorfs natural law ju-
risprudence， as this relates to such matter日 asthe natural rights 
and duties of men， the institution of the state司 therights and pow-
ers of sovereignty， civil law and the law of nations. In Part 3， the 
place that Pufendorf occupie白inthe tradition of international law is 
explained， and with particular reference to his affirming of certain 
foundational principles of modern international law and to the de-
fects that remain in the concept of international law for which he 
argued. In Part 4， the defects of the concept of international law 
elaborated by Pufendorf are considered， as these present themselves 
for consideration through attention to the work of his successors 
W olff and Vattel. 
i. Grotius and Hobbes 
The decisive contribution that Grotius made to the establishing of 
modern international law comes， first and foremost， inthe exposi-
tion of the law of war and peace that he provided in De Jure Belli 
αc Pacis. In the event， the concern of Grotius in De Jure BelliαcP，α-
cis did not lie exclusively with the law applying to the external rela-
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tion出 betweeni:tate日 andむhei1' 1'u181'8， and 80 with the 8ubject-
matters pertaining to intmすlationallaw prope1'. For the law of war 
and peace， as G1'otius expounded it， served to identi(y the natural 
rights and obligations of mcn， a呂itserved also to explain the origin 
and justification of the civil state， the basis and extent of the rights 
and powe1's of the state in respec七01'iも臼 subjects， and the basis and 
extent of the ob1igation出01'subj('ct臼intheωndition of the state. De凶
spite this， ithas to be admitted that much the greater part of De 
Jure Belliαc}込ciswas taken up with the exposition of the law of 
war and peace as it had appJication to states and rulers in their ex-
ternal relations with one anoもher.Thus Grotius here addressed 
such matters as: the conditions fo1' public war as waged by states 
on the autho1'ity of their rule1's; the just causes for war; the lawful 
rights belonging to 出tates8uch as w心reengaged in the waging of 
public war; tlf: principles of good faith bind:ing・onstates and their 
rulers， including the principles of good faith that states and rulers 
were required to confonn with in order to conclude the condition of 
war and restore the condition of peaee. 
The law of war and peace， as Grotius saw it applying to states 
and rulen;ラ wac;fbrmed f'rO!l1 V[げiousconstituentθlements or parts. 
Of the parts of the law of wa1' and peace that Grotius identifed and 
made refenmce t叫 thetwo that w拾recentral in the argument of De 
Jure Belli ac Paci日werethe lawむfnatu問、 01'jus natural也、 andせIC
understood to h投Vと
iL thc lnw of nature was a law that was 
to men considered as beings who 
actedヲ乳ndwho indeed w号問 eompelJedto act， so as to seeure the 
end of thむirO¥¥'ロdefi口氏ennd sd{二preseれ V段tion，'Ihus， for Grotius均
the law of natuずな W部 a law 01' selぶdefEmce，01' law of sel手
preseJ'vatiりlしanditndS111t111出品enseof it that the law of nature 
served 1.0 ground 1'iだれtthぉtwおお ibundationalin the G1'otian law 
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of war and peace. 'lhis was thεright of men to wage private war: 
that is， the right of men to aet， and where neeessary to adopt the 
means of war， inorder to defend and preserve themselves， and so 
seeure their property and personal rights. 1<1 However， itwas Groti-
us' view that the ful seeuring by men of the end of their own de-
fenee and self-preservation， and that of the defenee and preserva“ 
tion of their property and personal rights， involved not the exereise 
by men of the right of private war， but， rather， the partieipation of 
men in the speeifieally politieal form of soeiety and their eonformity 
with the fundamental principles of social order obtaining therein. 
'lhus the law of nature was not only a law of self-preservation， but 
also， and primarily so， the law of social order. It was in this sense of 
it that Grotius held that the law of nature was grounded in the eト
sential condition of human nature， in the respect that it was 
grounded in the natural indination of men towards soeiability. 171 
The principles of social order that Grotius saw as contained in 
the law of nature， as law grounded in the inclination of mcn to bc 
soeiable， were firstイll't1erprinciples of ju臼ticoand morality. The lat-
ter， essentiallyヲ were principlos that rolated to the requir府立lCnts
falling on men to respeet one anothげ inmatters to do with their 
personal， property and contractual rights‘to diseharge the obliga-
tions which cor1'esponded to these 1'ights， andヲ whe1'enecessaryラ to
inflict punishments on those who failed to respect the relevant 
rights 01' to discharge the relevant obligation札，81The maintenance 
of social order based in the personal， property and contractual 
1'ighu弓ofmen was something that， i()γGrotiu日， necθ宵sitntA'dthe in-
stitution of the state， where there would be present proper proce-
dures fo1' the making and enfbl'cement of laws capable of giving de-
terminate form and substance to the basie 分amewoγkprinciples of 
social order. Thus did Grotius think of the law of nature as imply-
ing the neee白sitythat men should estab1i出hstates i(Jr their seJf-
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government， and that men should maintain states and state institu-
tions through subjecting themselves to the will and power of rulers 
and to the laws which were issued by rulers to give effect to their 
will and power. 191 
In the classification of the different forms of law that Grotius 
provided in De Jure BelliαcPαcis， the law of nature was explained 
as being a universal law of reason， inthe sense that it embodied 
principles which were to be thought of as self二evidentto men in 
their natural condition as rational beings. Thus Grotius defined the 
law of nature as a dictate of right reason， which served to deter-
mine the moral necessity， or moral baseness， of acts according to 
their agreement， ordisagreement， with rational nature. 1叩 1Standing 
in opposition to the law of nature， there was the sphere of law that 
was to be explained not as law based in rational nature， but as law 
which had its origins in the will. This was the sphere of law that 
Grotius termed volitional law， orius voluntαrium， with the form of 
volitional law that originated in the will and agency of men being 
the volitional human law， or ius voluntαrill1n humαnum. 11 One 
form of volitional human law was state law， or municipal law. This 
was the law that was b1'ought into being and maintained through 
the civil power in the state. In cont1'ast to municipallaw， there was 
the positive 01' voluntary law of nations. The law of nations be-
longed to the sphere of volitional human law because it was law 
which originated in， and which de1'ived its binding normative force 
from， the wiU of nations. As fo1' the evidence fo1' the law of nations， 
considered as a fo1'm of ius voluntariwn humαnum， this was to be 
found in the unbroken customary practice of the nations， and in the 
testimony of the w1'iters who were learned in it. 121 
In the orde1' of exposition of the parts of the law of war and 
peace in De J ure Belli ac p，αcis， the law of nature was primary and 
foundational. This was so because， inGrotius' account of the matte1'， 
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the rights that belonged to individual men under the terms of the 
law of nature comprised the ultimate ground of origin and justifica-
tion for the rights that obtained among men in the civil state， and 
for the rights that states and rulers held and exercised in relation 
to one another in the international sphere. Certainly the law of na-
ture， for Grotius， served to found the part of the law of war and 
peace that pertained to the form of political order that was embod-
ied in the civil state. For the law of nature included among the 
principles of just conduct that it comprehended the principle of 
pacts:出atis， the principle that the terms of promises， and other 
such voluntary agreements， were to be fulfilled by the parties to 
them. It was this principle of just conduct that Grotius referred to 
in explanation of the generation of the state， and in explanation of 
the normative foundations of the system of rights and obligations 
holding as between rulers and subjects which were integral to the 
state as a form of human association. 1日l
The law of nature also served to found the part of the law of 
war and peac泡 thathad application to states and rulers in the 
sphere of their mutual external relations. 80， for example， itwas 
through reference to principles of just conduct comprehended within 
the law of nature that Grotius identified the basic lawful causes 
and justifications for the waging of war as being self-defence， the re-
covery of property and the punishment of wrong-doing. To be sure， 
the 0同ectsof war， as here mentioned， were treated of by Grotius as 
just causes for the exercise by individual men of their natural right 
of private war. Even so， the natural law sanction for self-defence， 
recovery of property and punishment of wrong-doing， as the legiti-
mate objects for war， was also something that Grotius appealed to 
quite explicitly in his explanation of the Iawful causes and justifica-
tions for the waging of public war by state authorities. 141 Then 
again， there is the principle of pacts as a fundamental principle of 
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natural law. This principle， inGrotius' t1'eatment of it， ranked not 
only as the no1'mative foundatおお for the form of legal order embod-
ied in the civil state. The p1'inciple also ranked as a gene1'al p1'inci-
ple of just conduct whose observance by states and 1'ule1's stood as 
an essential precondition fo1' stat貯sand rulers being able to gene1'刷
ate， through their own will and agreement， a body of law appropri-
ate fo1' the 1'egulation of thei1' external relations， and then to act in 
accordance with this law in mutual good faith. In this respect， the 
p1'inciple of pacts was， fo1' Grotius， the principle of natural law that 
served to provide the undcrlying normative foundation for the posi-
tive or voluntary law of nations. w， 
It is clear砧 then，that the law of natur8 contained general prirト
ciples of just conduct that Gずりtiussaw a8 having application to 
states and andむ!":11' wel! that certain of the principles 
contained in lilw of natllre stood a話thefoundatioI1 fo1' the posi-
tivc 01' law of nations， NevertheJessラthefact remains that 
the par七 tI1eおすすむf 設ndドザacethat Grotiu8 thought of a8 ap-
plying essenti設 to 冶 andrul羽 詰 inthoir む対d必e叶叫川?冷光刈r一、乍涜t首g
w附 t出hむla刊w可… むof昏I只1a拭土tio∞誌芯 C∞む1芯削泌お討idE的?乙汀一Iれγ代'可E付J刈d段附)治S治 F合お伽iり仰)沼rn‘'m()ばfvoぱli託tiωona1human law. 
Thu日itwa8 that GIて詰 devoteda日ub日tantialpart of De Jure Belli 
αPacis to thぞ ofwha七h会 tool王tobe the main elements 
or vol b"号iof and it is plain fI・omthe 
of it that he fb.i品 thelaw of nations proper as 
Hnd distin祭ui丹hablofrom tho law of 
nature. 土hむ elemE，nts the 1aw of nations that Grotius ex蝿
in Ju/'c Bclli ac the f()llowing are particularly 
worthy of 訪れ J:rwl'記長atinぷtothe eonditions fo1' the waging of 
pubJic war可 θferenむ tothe c(ヲnditionsof sovereign 
authority and 長合cla下 iunof wa1'; ilh! thl' law of embassies; 1171 
the law of buriλ1仇 thεtothe taking of good目。fsub-
jects to diseharどρ 込 oずrUlers;'1 the law relating to the 
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1'ights belonging to the pa1'ties to public wa1'， including 1'ights in 1'e-
spect of the killing of enemies， pillage， p1'isone1's of wa1' and the rul-
e1'ship of conque1'ed peoples; 1201 the law 1'elating to the p1'inciples of 
good faith that we1'e to be obse1'ved by bellige1'ents. 12'1 
The1'e a1'e two gene1'al cha1'acte1'istics of the positive 01' volun-
ta1'y law of nations which， as G1'otius explained it， go to unde1'line 
what was fo1' him the diffe1'ence between it and the law of natu1'e， 
and cha1'acte1'istics to which some explicit 1'efe1'ence must be made 
fo1' the pu1'poses of this pape1'. First， it was Grotius' view that the 
o1'igin and foundation of the law of nations was to be explained as 
lying not in the normative order given in nature itself， but rather in 
the will， agreement and consent of states and thei1' rulers， and that 
it was from the will， ag1'eement and con自entof states and rule1's 
that the law of nations derived it自bindingnormatIve force. Thus it 
was that when G1'otius pointed to the cont1'ast between the law of 
nations and the law of nature in De Jure Belliαc p，αcis， he empha-
sized that the law of l1ations was law that had its foundation in the 
mutual consent of states. 1叫 Likewis日Grotiu日maintained，as he did 
notably in cOl1nection with the 1'ights of states at war， that whe1'eas 
the no1'mative force of the principles of the law of nature was abso匂
lute， the nonnative force of the p1'inciples of the law of nations was 
conditional on the consent of those臼ubjectto it， 01'， in G1'otius' own 
formulation， 1'elative to some antecedent promissory act on thei1' 
pa1't. I山 l
The second cha1'acteristic of the law of nations that， inGrotius' 
exposition of the law of wa1' and peace，日ervesto differentiate it 
from the law of nature is that the law of nations proper was law 
whose p1'imary and essential sphere of applicatiol1 lay with the ex-
ternal 1'elations between states and 1'ule1's. This was not so with the 
law of natu1'e， as Grotius conceived of it and of its sphere of applica-
tion. For G1'otius saw the law of・nature江sa body of law that ap-
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plied primarily旬 individualmen， and only in a secondary and de-
rivative sense to states and rulers. Hence the standpoint of the law 
of nature was such that the essential form of war that it pertained 
to was that of private war: that is， war involving the adoption by 
individual men of the means of war in the exercise of their natural 
right to act in defence of themselves and their rights. 
In contrast to the law of nature， the positive or voluntary law of 
nations， for Grotius， was law that applied essentially to states and 
rulers in their external relations. In the event， however， Grotius did 
not only present the law of nations as law that applied essentially 
to states and rulers. In a st1'onger sense， Grotius p1'esented the law 
of nations as law that presupposed as the condition for its genera-
tion， and as the condition fo1' its application to men， the association 
of men in states， and the su~jection of men to state 1'ule1's possess-
ing the rights integraI to sovereign powe1'. Fo1' the law of nations， as 
Grotius expounded it， was Iaw that served tοdefine， and to regulate， 
the public rights that were distinctive to states as bearers of sover-
eign power as these rights were exe1'cised by states with respect to 
one another， and particularly so as regards the public rights that 
were bound up in the waging of wa1' by states on the basis of their 
sove1'eign authority. Thus it was that， fo1' Grotius， the essentiaI 
form of wa1' that pertained to the sphere of the law of nations was 
not private wa1'， ，as waged by individual men in thei1' own defence， 
but public war: that is， war waged by states on the authority of the 
sovereign powe1'， and in acco1'dance with such formal legaI ∞ndi・
tions as， for example， the condition that the1'e should be a declara-
tion of war i日suedby the state 1'ule1's concerned. Indeed， itis pe吋i-
nent 加 observehere， inconnection with the matter of public war， 
that G1'otius was apt to p1'esent a la1'ge part of the substantive law 
of nations as Iaw that foIlowed as the effect， 01' the consequence， of 
the right of public wa1' as a monopoly right belonging to states and 
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rulers. I制l
In this， Grotius' specification of the positive or voluntaJγlaw of 
nations， and his differ官 ltiationof it from the law of nature， carried 
an important implication regarding the law of nations in its charac-
ter as law that applied to states and rulers in the intemational 
sphere. This was that the principles of the law of nations were to be 
thought of as principles that reflected， and answered to， the particu-
lar condition and attributes of states and rulers in their status as 
the subjects of the law of nations， and hence principles that were on 
this account to be distinguished from the bare principles of the law 
of nature as such， asthis was understood to have application to in-
dividual men in respect of their specifically natural condition and 
attributes. The implication， here， was one that was to be worked 
through by Wolff and Vattel in their attempt to differentiate the 
law of nations企omthe law of nature proper， although， as it is ar-
gued in this paper， the implication waS not one that was recognized 
or worked through by Pufendorf in his natural law jurisprudence. 
In the period after Grotius， there emerged two distinct schools 
of writers on the law of nations. First， there was a positivist school， 
whose members included the German jurist Samuel Rachel (1628幽
91) and the Dutch jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673-1743). 
For the positivist writers， the law of nations was presented as law 
based in the consent and practice of states， with the substantive 
rules and principles comprising the law being looked for in such 
conventional sources as state custom and state treaties. ln addition， 
there was a pure naturalist school of writers on the law of nations， 
for which writers the law applying to the relations between sta旬s
and rulers was understood to be given in what were expounded as 
universal principles of natural law. 
One notable representative of the naturalist school was Hobbes， 
as with the argument regarding the principles of law， state and gov・
p_g 
65 
UY 
PlJFENDりRFAND TNTERNATIONAL LA鴨川CovelIl
ernment that is set out in his LεvlαtIlan (1651). 12'>i 1n this work， 
Hobbes made direct and explicit reference to what he saw as first-
order principles of natural law‘which principles he identified as the 
principles of peace‘For Hohbes， as for Grotius before him， the prin-
ciples of natural law were principles relating to the defence and 
prese1'vation of m昔nand their 1'ights， and relating to the basic 
仕amewo1'kof目。cialorder which was剖 sentia1to this end. As fo1' 
the substance of the natural law， this included the fundamental 
principle that provided 101' the general duty falling on men to en-
deavour peace， and the related right of men to adopt the means of 
war in defence of themselves where peace was unattainable. A1so 
included among the prineiples of natural law were the 1'ule that 
men should restriet thei1' rights on a recip1'ocal basis， the 1'u1e 1'elat幽
ing to the faith ot‘agTeements， the 1'¥1e requi1'ing that men should 
recognize one another as equals， and various 1'ules to do with the 
duty fali口氏。nmen to submit their disputes conceming rights to 
procedure日οfindepend記長tadjudication. As Hobbes explained them， 
the principles 01' natural law were to be thought ()1' as presenting 
themselves to the 1'eason of men in the natural condition of thei1' 
mulual relations， which for Hobbes， was famously that of 
the war of al against all. this eondition of thei1' l11utual relations， 
men possessed and wel'e to時間'cisethe 1'ight of war so as to secure 
their own defence and pre品ervation，but were nevertheless com-
pelled to exercise this 1'ight in circumstances where self~ 
p1'eservation was nむt tひbむ achiuved.F'or In the natural con同
ditiOI1 of universal war， a話 Hobbosfamou日1ycharadorized it， llel1 
wero日ubjeetto no eommon pnw{>.r sufficient to maintain ef長ctive
peaee and order axnong them. Likewis(ヨ， men in the natural state of 
war were entin向freliant theiI' own il1dividual strength and in-
itiatiτiTe to clofend and pres日vethemselves， and were so situated in 
relation to on，三 nnotherth，兆 had no recour日eto determinate 
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and enforceable rules for the re伊 lationof their mutual conduct and 
the defining of their property rights. 1261 
According to Hobbes， men in the condition of universal war 
were to be thought of as being directed by reason to adopt and fol-
low the law of nature， and to give effect to the ends of peace to 
which the natural law pointed. Specifically， men were directed to 
institute and enter into the form of association embodied in states， 
and to do this through establishing and submitting themselves to a 
sovereign power possessing the particular rights and powers which 
were essential to states. For Hobbes， the establishing of and sub-
mission to such a sovereign power by men required some act of will 
and agreement on their part， and this act he termed covenant. As 
for the sovereign rights and powers pertaining to state日thatHobbes 
saw as brought into being through the act of covenanting， these in幽
cluded the rights and powers relating to the promuIgation and 
maintenance of civil laws， as the law that derived from the wilI of 
the sovereign and that， as such， stood fo1' Hobbes as the essential 
form of human positive law. Thus the sovereign ruler in the state 
was to hold the legislative power together with the powers of adju幽
dication and law enforcement， which powers su部cedto ensure the 
context of general security for the person and determinacy in the 
provision of general rules relating to conduct and property as had 
been absent from the natural condition of war among men. 1訂i
As regards the question of the external relations among states 
and sovereign rulers in the international sphere， Hobbes took出e
position that日tatesand sovereign rulers were to be considered as 
co-existing together in the same condition of universal war in which 
individual men were situated prior to the estab1i日hingof 日tates
through covenant. However， there was no suggestion on the part of 
Hobbes that states were to overcome the condition of universal war 
through covenanting to establish， and to submit to， a comIilon 
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power to govern over thell1. In consequence of this， there was no 
possibility ente1'tained by Hobbes that states and thei1' sovereign 
rulers ll1ight be subject to 1'egulation th1'ough laws which proceeded 
f1'oll1 the wiU of some supe1'ior law-ll1aking power. On the cont1'a1'y， 
Hobbes was quite clear that the law of nations， asthe law applying 
to states and rulers in the international sphere， was not to be 
thought of as having the form of human positive law 01' as incorpo-
rating elements of human positive law， but was rather to be 
thought of as consisting in the same principles of natural law that 
summa1'ized the basic te1'ms of peace which we1'e to be followed by 
men p1'io1' to the establishing of states. Thus it was that the basic 
principles of law that Hobbes considered we1'e to have application to 
states and sovereign 1'ule1's， inthe international sphere， were such 
p1'inciples as those relating to the duty of endeavouring peace， the 
right of self-defence， 1'ecip1'ocity in the lill1itation of mutual rights， 
the faith of abrreell1ents， the recognition of the equality of the sub-
jects of the law， and the submission of disputes ove1' rights to ind。
pendent arbitration. I剖 IHere， Hobbes wa自 tobe followed by Pufen-
dorf， who stands as the othe1' notable 1'epresentative of the pure 
naturalist school of writing on the law of nations in the period after 
Grotius， and who， as it will now become apparent， was in the mat-
ter of the natu1'alistic view of the law of nations that he favoured in 
ce1'tain m吋01'respects closer to Hobbes than he was to Grotius. 
i. Pufendorf and Naturall.aw Jurisprudence 
?
??
?
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九 Theproject that Pufendorf set himself in jurisprudence reached its 
68 culmination with the publication in 1672 of the cOll1prehensive trea-
tise on the law of nature and the law of nations entitled De Jure 
Natur，αe et Gentium， and with this work being followed one year 
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later in 1673 with the abridgment of its argument that was pub-
lished in the form of a summary of the duties of men and citizens 
under natural law entitled De Officio Hominis et Civis juxta Legem 
Nαturalem. Essential to the project carried through in these works 
was the endeavour by Pufendorf to isolate， and to speciちr，the fun-
damental principles of natural law that he took to relate to the con-
duct of individual men， and to set the terms of the association of 
men 旬getherwithin society and the state. 1n this undertaking， 
Pufendorf distinguished natural law from such other forms of law 
as remained irreducibly positive and voluntary in their charac旬r.
Thus natural law was contrasted with the divine law that embodied 
the will of God，部 thiswas revealed 加 menthrough the 8criptures. 
80 also was natural law set apart from the various sys担msof civil 
law， which law was established through the will of rulers of states 
and was， as such， determinative of the rights and duties of men in 
their status as the subjects of the particular states wherein it was 
laid down. As opposed to divine law and civil law as forms of posi-
tive law， the naturallaw was a law based not in will but in reason， 
and， inbeing so， itstood as a universal law that defined the rights 
and duties which belonged to al men without regard for their mem-
bership of particular states and nations. Hence the naturallaw， for 
Pufendorf， was the law that was common to al men and to al na-
tions， and it was in this sense that the law of nature and of nations 
is to be understood as it is made reference to in the title， and in the 
ar♂nnent， ofthe treatise De Jure Nαtur，αe etGentium. 
The substantive principles of the natural law， in their essen副
tials， were for Pufendorf what they had been for Grotius and Hob-
bes. Thus the law of nature was a law that was grounded in the 
right of men to act for the ends of their own self-preservation， and 
so act to secure and defend themselves in their person and in their 
rights. At the same time， the law of nature defined the foundational 
?
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principles of social order， and the duties based in these principles， 
whose observance by men was understood to be the precondition for 
the securing of their defence and self-preservation， and for the se帽
curing of their rights as relating to the person， toproperty and 旬
promissory agreements. The law of nature， then， was for Pufendorf 
the law of self-preservation and the law of social order， orsociabil-
ity (socialitαs). In addition， the principles of natural law as relating 
旬 self-preservationand social order were divided into three distinct 
categories， inaccordance with the different objects of the substan-
tive duties which the principles concerned stipulated. First， there 
were the duties imposed through natural law that men were to be 
thought of as owing to God. Second， there were the duties imposed 
through natural law that men were to be thought of as owing to 
themselves. Third， there were the duties imposed through natural 
law that men were to be thought of as owing to one another. 1291 
The principal duties that men owed to God in consequence of 
the natural law were duties concerning the forming of proper con-
ceptions as to the nature of God's existence， His attributes and His 
powers， and concerning the proper honouring of God at the level of 
conduct and practice through the appropriate forms of internal and 
public worship. The duti師。fmen towards ('xud under natural law 
were dutie自relatingto the sphere of natural religion and concern岨
ing the promotion of the internal cohesion of state and society， and， 
as such， they were duties that were independent of the principles of 
divine law as these were revealed to men through the Scriptures. 1301 
The duties that men owed to themselves in consequence of 
natural law were based in what Pufendorf presented as the funda-
mental obligation falling on men to defend and preserve themselves. 
The duty of self-preservation， a自 Pufendorfexplained it in De Jure 
Naturae et Gentium.ラ wasbroadly conceived， and it included the 
duty belonging to al men to develop themselves through the culti-
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vation and exercise of their natural gifts and talents， and hence in 
more general terms through the perfecting of their intellectual and 
physical nature. 1出l
However， the crucial part of the principle of self-preservation 
lay in the conferring on men of the natural right to defend them-
selves， through the killing or injuring of those who subjected them 
to violent attack in their person or who violated their rights and 
property. For Pufendorf， the natural right of self-defence was foun-
dational， and it held both in the condition of natural liberty where 
men were to be thought of as being situated outside of or prior to 
the establishing of the state，加din the condition of the state itself. 
ln the condition of naturalliberty， the right of日elιdefencewas such 
that men were permitted to take pre“emptive measures against po・
tential attackers， to punish attackers， and to secure guarantees 
from them against further assaults. ln the condition of the state， 
where men were subject to the authority of civil government， the 
right of self-defence was strictly limited. Thus the exercise of force 
by men for the purposes of self-deumce was， here， permis日ibleonly 
in circumstances where there existed no opportunity for them to ap-
peal to the civil authorities for assIstance and protection， while al 
rights relating to pre-emptions， punishments and guarantees in con臨
nection with injuries to persons were reserved to the civil authori-
ties on an exclusive basis. Despite this， men retained the right of 
self-defence in the civil state as an inalienable right， and this reten欄
tion of the right of self-defence by men as civil subject日 confirms
and underlines how， for Pufi:mdorf， the law of nature stood as a law 
of self-preservation. 1"21 ln addition， the natural duties that men 
owed to themselves as relating to their self-preservation were such 
that men were allowed the benefit of the rights of necessity. Thus in 
certain situations of dire and immediate peril， men were permitted 
to place others at risk of injury or even death， al1d to Il1vade their 
??? ?
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property， inorder to defend and preserve themselves. 131 
The third category of natural law principles that Pufendorf 
specified were the principles that stated the duties which men were 
to be thought of as owing to one another. The duties of this kind 
were either absolute duties or hypothetical duties， and the various 
duties that Pufendorf saw as falling in the absolute and hypotheti-
cal categories were elaborated in extensive detail in De Jure Mαtu-
rae et Gentium. The absolute duties in natural law to which men 
were subject in their conduct towards one another were the duties 
that men were to be thought of as owing to one another both uni-
versally and by nature in the direct sense， and hence prior to， and 
independent of， the formation of any human custom or institution. 
The hypothetical duties to which men were subject under natural 
law were the duties that men were to be thought of as owing to one 
another not on a universal basis and by nature direct， but only in 
consequence of the existence of some particular human custom， in-
stitution or state which had been established and accepted by men 
through some specific act on their pa比 1:l41
The first and most fundamental of the absolute duties that men 
owed under natural law was the duty falling on men to respect 
their mutual rights， and to refrain from harming one another in 
their person and in their rights. This duty extended to al men uni-
versally and without exception， and it was， as Pufendorf presented 
it， the underlyirig foundation of al social order and of the various 
rights that were secured to men through the maintenance of social 
order. Thus it was a duty that was such as to郡laranteeto men 
proper protection for what rightfully belonged 加 themby virtue of 
their common human nature， such as their life， bodily integrity and 
liberty. At the same time， the duty was such that it guaranteed to 
men proper protection for that which belonged to them in conse-
quence of the presence of some human institution or convention， 
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such as， crucially， that which belonged to them as the subject-
matter of their property rights. Hence the duty imposed on men in 
natural law to refrain 企omharming one another in their person 
and their rights was implicit in the general prohibition on the com-
mission of first田order世imes，as with murder， physical assault to 
the person， robbery and theft. Related to this duty was the basic re-
quirement of just conduct that where men harmed one another， and 
so in創ngedrights， then they were to act to make good the loss or 
damage caused. Thus it was that， for Pufendorf， the principle for-
bidding men from doing harm to one another in their person and 
their rights presupposed the rule of restitution， as a rule essential 
to the maintenance of social order in accordance with the terms of 
naturallaw.l:w1 
The second absolute duty imposed in natural law that PufEm-
dorf saw as being owed by men towards one another was the duty 
falling on men to reco伊lIzeone another in their natural equality. 
This duty was grounded in the fundamental principle that al men 
were equal by nature， and， as such， itwas a duty that Pufendorf ex-
plained as a necessary precondition for social order subject to the 
constraints of the rule of law. For it was a duty that required men 
to recognize one another as equals under the law， and in conse椿
quence of this to recognize one another as bearers of such rights 
and obligations as were embodied in natural law and in positive law 
on the basis of strict reciprocity. Hence there followed the prima fa-
cie impropriety under natural law of men exempting themselves 
from the duties imposed through laws that were binding on others， 
and so also the impropriety of men reserving right自forthemselves 
which they were not prepared to concede to others. 1361 
Next among the absolute duties of naturallaw that fel on men 
in respect of their conduct towards one another were what Pufen・
dorf called the common duties of humanity. These were general du-
???
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ties of benevolence through the performance of which men were 
able to be useful to one another， as far as this was convenient to 
themselves， and so provide gratuitous services and benefits for one 
another in such a way as to promote mutual assistance and co・
operation and hence mutual good will among men. As Pufendorf ex-
plained them， the common duties of humanity were grounded in the 
rule of gratitude. For， ashe argued， the common duties of humanity 
were such as to presuppose the preparedness of men to extend 
benefi総 toone another， with it following 仕omthis， asa principle of 
naturallaw， that men were to show gratitude towards benefactors， 
and hence to act towards benefactors in such a way that the latter 
would never have cause to regret their good wilI. 1;171 
The last of the absolute duties fal1ing on men under natural 
law that Pufendorf considered was the duty of good faith that fel 
on men who were the parties to agreements， orpacts. As Pufendorf 
explained it， the duties of men regarding the refraining from harm-
ing one another， regarding the mutual recognition of their natural 
equality and regarding the concerns based in common humanity 
were absolute duties歩 but，in themselves， remained insufficient to 
stand as a normative framework for effective social order. For men 
to secure the ful benefits open to them through association within 
ordinary society， then it was essential， Pufendorf argued， that they 
should enter into explicit agreements with one another， where these 
agreements would serve to estab1ish fixed rules and principles to 
govern the interactions of men， and to do this through providing a 
precise determInation of their mutual rights and duties. The bene-
fits for men of the practice of voluntary agreements were self-
evident in tenns of the facilitating of the exchange of goods and 
service民 andthe structuring of individual pr伊 ctsand inter-
personal relations so as to avoid conflict and deception among men. 
Thus it was that， toground the practice of voluntary agreement， 
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there was to be assumed to hold a fundamental， and absoluteヲduty
imposed on men under D拭urallaw to the pffect that men were al-
way自 toact to fulfiI the terms of their promises and agrepments in 
good faith. ，;" 
The principle of the faith of agl'eementョwasa principle of natu.. 
ral law that Pufendorf saw as conferring a quite particular norma但
tive自tatuson the duties and obligations that were defined in the 
actual agreements which w('r可ラ brought into being in accordance 
with its terms. Of speciaI relevance， hen) ， isthe distinction that 
Pufendorf drew， in diseus日ionof good faith， a日betweenthe duties 
owed by men such as were consequent on a promise 01' a符reement
and the dutie百thatwe1'e owed by men a8 common duti針。fhumanω
ity企 The sphere of the emnmon duties of humanity wa息苦 fo1' Pufen“ 
do1'f， a sphere of authent1e and but onlyっfImpe!やct
right明日ndduti空自 (ius
taining to the ぞofth台 commondl式 of
and duties where proper 心むndud
1'equ8s十.ed，and imprnpけ 2 むのnduct
were rights 
to them mü~'ht be 
thmn e昨日目uredon 
grounds of inhumanity， but where the1'e w設丹没vailahleno recourse 
to legitimate inst1'umentalities of主立会ercion吊uchaメtocompel men to 
hOl1our the rights and to fbltil the dutie出 tlUefョtion， I fl Cのntrastto 
the sphere of the common duties ()f 
lse日 andagreements among men waぉthe
and duti(叫 (iu:;OeJず{?cturnI> Forもh('
through promi白e日 and wε1'e 
l'ights 
and dなtie詰 creatpd
th1' Puumdorf， in 
the respect that these Wf're right話 andduties thみtwere supported 
by a eoercive powerラand京lhe1'8it wa黒pJ'operand i(lr the 
means of coe1'cIon to be 1'8限延'tedto in order toむompelmen to re息
日pectthe 1'ights concerned投ndto fnlfil主he王lntieseon(見守1・ned.1;)9; 
The distinction between imperfeet 広札口dduties and perfect 
rights and duties， as Pufendorf explained it in the context of prom-
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ises and agreements， relates very directly to what is a central claim 
that he advanced regarding the principle of the faith of agreements. 
This was that the principle of the faith of agreements stood as the 
bridge， or connecting link， between the absolute duties that the 
natural law imposed on men with respect to one another and the 
hypothetical duties to which men were subject from the standpoint 
of the natural law. As it has been explained， the duties stated in 
the hypothetical principles of natural law were， for Pufendorf， du-
ties that he saw as presupposing， as the condition for their applica-
tion to men， the context provided for by some custom or institution 
which had been introduced and accepted by men. In the view of 
Pufendorf， the institutions that provided the context for the applica-
tion to men of the hypothetical duties set through natural law were 
institutions that were founded in some specific agreement among 
men， and hence in日titutionsthat presupposed for their establishing 
and maintenance the acceptance by men of the absolutism of the 
foundational principle of the faith of agrecments. There were three 
principal institutions that Pufendorf recognized and discussed in De 
Jllre Natllr，αe et Gentillm as belonging to the category of institu-
tions founded in agreements: the institution of language; the insti-
tution of property and ownership， with this including subject-
matters relating to property ownership rights that involved value 
and the exchange of values; the institution of government in the 
condition of the civil state. I刊 l
The institution of language was an institution based in the tacit 
agreement of men， and， as such， itwas held by Pufendorf to be gov-
erned by the principle of good faith in the matter of the duties to 
which it gave rise. Thus there was a general duty falling on men to 
76 apply the words belonging to their language in a regular and consis-
tent manner， inaddition to a general duty to speak truthful1y in al 
circumstances where there existed a legitimate I"ight and expecta-
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tion that the truth should be told. !11 
In the account that Pufendorf gave of it， the basic structure of 
the institution of property ownership and value was explained in 
terms of hypothetical duties of natural law that served very clearly 
to give determinate effect to certain of the principal of the absolute 
duties of natural law. This was 80， particularly， with regard to the 
duties in natural law that related to the respecting by men of their 
mutual rights， and to the requirement that men 8hould fulfil the 
terms of their promises and agreement白 ingood faith. At the same 
time， the institution was explained in terms where the hypothetical 
duties in naturallaw that concerned property ownership rights， and 
the exchange of property rights involving considerations of value， 
were duties that pointed to the legal forms and legal categories 
whose adoption by men would serve to render their substantive 
rights and duties relating to property ownership as perfect， and 
hence fully enforceable， rights and duties. Thus Pufendorf laid down， 
and elaborated， the hypothetical principles of natural law that had 
application to such as the following subjectωmatters: the origin of 
ownership in things， the bases of property ownership， the limita命
tions on property ownership with respect to its objects， and the 
modes of acquisition of property; 1叫 theduties falling on men in 
consequence of their having ownership in things; Il! the principles 
relating to the determination of the value of things utlling under 
rights of ownership as subjects for exchange; 1¥1 the duties of men 
in the forming and fulfilment of contractual agreements involving 
the exchange of rights in things possessing value， and this with ref~ 
erence to the different forms of contractual agreement;川 theprin-
ciples governing the discharging of the duties set through contrac-
tual agreements， as with the performance 01" the payment of that 
which was owed. 14fjl 
In the highly detailed specification that Pufendorf provided of 
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the civil state， asal institution based in agreement， the civil state 
was distinguished from certain other forms of human assocIation 
whose existence it presupposed， and whose internal authority r唱la-
tions it comprehended. Central among the forms of association that 
Pufendorf treated of were the estate of marriage， the family rela-
tions as between parents and children， and the relations between 
masters and their日lavesand servants. At the same time， there 
were expounded by Pl.lfendorf the hypothetical principles of natural 
law pertainingωthe civil state as concerned sl.lch sl.lbject-matters 
as the following: the constitutive causes of states， the internal 
structure of states， the functions of the sovereign power， the forms 
of state government、civi1law， property， and the powers of sovereign 
rulers with 臨時pectto the making of war and peace and with re-
spect to the forming of treaties with other states. For Pufendorf， the 
establishing of the institution of the civil state was essential for the 
ful perfecting of a1 the variou開rightsand duties that belonged to 
men under the terms of natural law. Thu日thecivil state was pre幽
sented by Pufendorf as an in話titutionpossessing the means of coer岨
cive power su節cienttu ensure the actual securing of the rights of 
men， and the設はualfulfilment of the duties of men. This was so 
with the rights and duties that were defined in the absolute natural 
law， and with the right日andduties that were embodied in the 0子
ganization 01' property ownership and contractuaI relations obtain-
ing among men in acむordaneewith the hypothetical principles of 
naturallaw. It was also so with the rights and duties that were em-
bodied in the 1'orms of human association， such as the family and 
the relation 01' masters to slaves and日ervants，which were distinct 
ft'om the civil state as such. The security that Pufendorf saw the 
state as providing 1'01' men in regard to their various rights and du-
ties was the principal rむspectin which he thought of the state as 
serving to overcome， and 80 to transcend， the defects and limita-
78 
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tions of what he presented as the speeifically natural conclitiol1 of 
the society holding among I1WI1 in their relations with one another. 
The natural condition of the obtainil1g among men， as 
Pufendorf described it， was a condition of soむ thatwas to be 
thought of as standing in oppositionもoth8 condition of society 
which was to be found in the civil state. Hobbes had defined the 
natural condition of the relations among men出 thestate of univer-
sal war， and， in explanation of this， he had pointed to how， in their 
natural society， meI1 were denied th己benefitsthat came with sub田
jection to a common governmentaJ power， the provisIon ()f p1'ope1' se司
cu1'ity fo1' the person， and the p1'esεnce of determinate and enfiυrce-
able rules ()f just conduct. Pufendorf did not follow Hobbes in pre-
senting the natu1'al condition of thむ 1'e1誌もionsamong men as the 
state of war as such‘詰incehe話awmen in this condition a品 bound
together through nature in the fbrm of in their conト
mon humanity. Even so， itrnust be emphasiz記dthat Puf，εndorf ac-
cepted and made reference to， as his p陀 m均的 inargument， pre-
cisely the characteristics ()f the natural coudition ()f men which Hob-
bes had cited in support of h1S claim that thisむondition()f昂ociety
was the state of war. 
1n specific termsラthestate of na七u.reラ昆 Puucmdorfdεsel'ibed iし
was the state ()f natural libertv and natura! wherと men
were 仕eeto exercise th.oir I'ight and powげ初日れでぬとirown endsう
and to do this without 臼む1 to sup念式01'お，tl戸ぬ Thusin the 
state of nature， meロwereto act to presel'V告む1ぉ and‘indo句
ing so， todetermine f()r themsむ}刊誌 泌はおふ?f込凶 andseeure 
thei1' person and their rights. However‘ 主主おどe¥v出 thisnatural 
???
state no proper and effeetive む rn日n¥VA:;re elト 11.
ti1'ely dependent on their own individual 
su1'e the ends of their self~nreservatìon. . therセwasno 
common power with the authority加と gov訂 mnentover mむ1.
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As a consequence of this， there was in the statεof nature no power 
authorized to adjudicate and settle disputes among men as regards 
their rights， toprescribe rules appropriate for such adjudicative pro-
ceedings， or to apply such coercive日anctionsagainst offenders as 
were necessary for the enforcement of adjudications. The absence of 
such a common power， for Pufendorf， did not make for a state of 
war in itself. However， itdid mean， ashe explained， that the natu圃
ral state of men was a condition of society where there was no 
proper institutional context for the rights and duties affirmed in 
natural law予 andhence no proper institutional context for the full 
realization of the ends that were set for men under natural law as 
concerned their self-preservation and sociability. 1471 
The ends of selfpreservation and sociability were to be realized， 
and the natural condition of society among men transcended， only 
within the in自titutionalcontext that was set through the civil state. 
According to Pufendorf， the PIオncipalcausal faGtors at work in the 
development of the state lay in the concern of men for protection 
from harm and enjoyment of the positive benefit日 ofsocial exis-
tenee. サHowever，th合 underlyingfoundation for the state， and for 
the establishing of the governmeれもalpower essential to it， consisted 
in the agreement of me立 Thiswa白sobecause， by nature， men were 
free and equal， and hcnce independent of al superior authority， 
with the con臼equenccthat the subjection of men to the authority of 
the form of government maintained in the state required an explicit 
aet of agreement by which the state， as an institution， was created 
and estahlish吋.The state involved a unified association of men， so
as to ensure decisi時間日目 injudgments as regards conimon ends， 
and the subjeetion of men as associated to some common power， so 
as to ensure that men would in fact respect the rights of one an-
other and thus 3ct for the common interest. Hence， for Pufendorf， 
the agreement founding the state comprised hoth an agreement co任
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cerning the establishing of the state as an association， and an 
agreement that concerned the determination of the person or per-
sons on whom the institutional powers specific to the state were to 
be conferred. The state， as instituted through agreement， stood as a 
distinct legal person with its own rights and property， and with a 
capacity for independent will and agency that was to be exercised 
by the person or persons discharging the governmental powers es-
sential to rulership in the state and hence possessing the rights and 
powers of sovereignty. 1491 
The object of concern of the sovereign ruler in the state lay 
with the public good， and with the security of the state and of its 
subjects. In regard to this concern， the sovereign ruler held and ex-
ercised certain rights and powers which， asPufendorf described and 
explained them， were indivisible rights and powers. Hence the sov・
ereign ruler held the legislative power， as exercised in the promul-
gation of the general rules of conduct that comprised the civil law. 
The rules of civil law were to serve， among other things， to define 
the forms of conduct permitted and prohibited to subjects， todeter閉
mine the property holdings of subjects and to determine the rights 
of subjects with regard to one another. At the same time， the sover幽
eign ruler held powers relating to the executive enforcement of the 
law， as exercised through the imposing of punishments on those 
who breached the laws， and the adjudicative power， as exercised 
through the judicial settlement of controversies concerning the ap-
plication of the law to particular cases. The sovereign ruler was also 
empowered to wage war against other states， tomake peace with 
the same， and to enter into treaties and alliances. In addition to the 
rights and powers of war and peace， the sovereign ruler held the 
powers involved in the appointment of public officials charged with 
the administration of the business of the state， as well as the pOW-
ers involved in the levying of such taxes as were necessaηto meet 
問
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the expenses of the state in its conduct of public administration. 1501 
There were di貨erentconstitutional forms for the governmental 
power through which the rights of sovereignty were exercised in the 
state. 80， for example， Pufendorf held that the government of the 
state might be constituted as a monarchy， as an aristocracy or as a 
democracy， with the form of state constitution being a matter of 
convention and hence the product of some act of agreement. The 
crucial consideration in this， for Pufendorf， was that whatever the 
form of constitution for government that was adopted in the state 
through convention， the rights of sovereignty exercised through the 
government， as it was constituted， remained the same. 151 80 also， in
Pufendorfs view， did出ematter of the ∞nstitutional form of gov-
emment in the state leave unaffected the defining characteristics of 
govemmental authority in the state which， as he picked them out， 
served to identi命thestate as a sovereign and independent form of 
association. Thus， for example， the govemmentaI authority in the 
state was to be thought of as possessing the characteristic of su“ 
premacy. This was so in the respect that the state exercised author-
ity in accordance with its own will and judgment， and with the acts 
proceeding from state authority being free from subjection to the 
will of any extemaI power or agency claiming superiority in relation 
to it. Likewise， the authority in the state was to be thought of as 
possessing the characteristic of norトaccountability.This was so in 
the respect that the state was not to be compelled by some superior 
power to render an accounting for the exercise of its own authority， 
or to be held liable to punishment in connection with this. To take a 
final example， the governmental authority in the state was to be 
thought of as being immune仕'omsubordination to civil law， and 
this for the reason that the governing authority， as the sovereign 
power， was the source of civil law and hence， by definition， incapa-
ble of being subject to the civil law in its specifically public 
?????
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The characteristics of sovereignty that Pufendorf picked out go 
to underline that he saw the legislative power， as a power relating 
to civil law， as central among the rights that belonged to the gov-
ernmental authority in the state. As Pufendorf explained it， the 
civil law was distinct from natural law in that it was law that was 
generated through the wi1l of the sovereign ruler， and hence law 
that presupposed the existence of the 日tateas an institution 
founded in agreement. Despite this， the civil law was based in natu-
ral law， with its binding normative force for men being bound up 
with the first-order principles of natural law to which it gave effect. 
Hence the civil law defined the va1'ious rights that men were to 1'e-
spect in one another under natural law. At the same time， the civil 
law served to give effect to the agreements that men entered into in 
accordance with the law of nature stipulating the uuth of agree-
ments. Central among the agreements that the civiJ law gave effect 
to， he1'e， we1'e the agreements of men relating to cont1'actual rights 
and property ownership right爪 andthose relating to the institution 
of the state itself and to the obligation falling・onmen to obey the 
sovereign ruler and to conform with the 1'ules of law which the ruler 
laid down. 
The particular distinction of civil law as a form of legal regula-
tion， fo1' Pufendorf， lay in its contributing proper specificity and de-
cisiveness in the determination of the rights and duties contained in 
natural law. A further distinguishing feature of the civil law that 
Pufendorf emphasized was that the civil Jaw gave 1'i白eto an institu-
tional st1'ucture encompassing judicial procedures and the means 
and instrumentalities for the executive enforcement of the laws. 
This institutional structure was essential for the establi日hingof the 
rule of Iaw in the condition of the civil state， and essential fo1' the 
proper effecting of the provisions of natural law. For the institu-
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tional structure specific to civil law was seen by Pufendorf as the 
precondition for the adequate observance by men of their duties un・
der natural law， through its providing for adequate judicial reme-
dies and effective penalties to be applied in the event that duties 
were not discharged. Thus it was that， inPufendorfs account of it， 
the civil law， and the sovereign rights of adjudication and punish-
ment associated with the maintenance of civil law in the state， 
worked to buttress the precept8 of natural law with the sanction of 
coercive power， and， in doing 80， went to ensure that within the 
state the rights and duties of men laid down in natural law were 
ully established as perfect rights and duties. I開l
The supremacy， non-accountability and exemption 合omcivil 
law that Pufendorf presented as intrinsic to the sovereign power in 
the state were intimately bound Up with the role that he saw as be-
ing played by the state， and by the rule of law that the state main-
tained， in bringing full realization to the ends of the natural law 
through the full perfection of the rights and duties出atthe natural 
law contained. This perfecting by the state of the rights and duties 
of men under natural law of course necessitated the subordination 
of men to the rights and powers of the sovereign ruler， and these 
rights and powers were absolute in the sense implicit in the attrib-
uting to the governmental authority in the state， asbearer of sover-
eignty， of the qualities of supremacy， norトaccountabilityand exemp-
tion from limitation under civil law. The question that presents it-
self here， and that IS central to the concerns of this paper， isto do 
with how， and in what form， states that were sovereign in the re-
spects that Pufendorf identified were to be thought of as standing to 
one another in the international sphere under constraint and regu帽
lation through law. 
In regard to this question， itmust be emphasized at once that 
in De Jure Naturαe et Gentium， Pufendorf very clearly pointed to 
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the presence of an authentic legal framework which to was apply to 
the relations among states and rulers in the international sphere. 
This was done through the specification that Pufendorf gave of the 
rights belonging to the sovereign power in the state as concerned 
war and peace， and as concerned the forming of treaties. For in the 
matter of these rights of sovereignty， Pufendorf set out the basic le幽
gal principles， atthe level of hypothetical natural law， that he held 
were to re伊llatethe conduct of states and rulers in the sphere of 
their mutual co-existence. Thus Pufendorf confirmed the thrust of 
classic just war doctrine through his insistence that the waging of 
W訂 bystates required just cause， such as defence against unlawful 
attack， the collection of what was duly owed， and the securing of 
proper restitution for wrongs inflicted and proper assurances for fu-
ture security. He also followed just war doctrine through his insis剛
tence that the rights of war and peace in relation to the state were 
monopoly rights of the sovereign ruler， with the right of initiating 
war and the right of concluding peace agreements to terminate wars 
being rights which belonged to the sovereign on a sole and exclusive 
basis. 1541 1n the matter of treaties， Pufendorf summarized the princi-
ples relating to the law of treaties， considered as law applying to 
voluntary agreements entered into by the independent sovereign 
rulers of states. 80， for example， he identified the category of state 
treaties that defined general rights and duties set in naturaI law， 
such as treaties providing for diplomatic rights and for the estab剛
Iishing of friendly relations and trade and commerce among nations. 
At the same time， he distinguished these treaties from the category 
of sta旬 treatiesthat he saw as giving effect to rights and duties 
which were not as such set in naturallaw.伊丹1
1n principle， the rights of sovereignty concerning war and peace 
and the Iaw applying to treaties， as Pufendorf expounded them， be-
longed to the law of nations， considered as the form of international 
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law that served to regulate the external relations among states and 
rulers. This was certainly how it had been for Grotius， as with his 
exposition of the principles of the law of war and peace in De Jure 
Belli C1C P.αcis. As opposed to Grotius， Pufendorf did not identify the 
rights of war and peace， and the law of treaties， as belonging to the 
sphere of the law of nations proper. For Pufimdor王therights of war 
and peace and the rights relating to tmaties， as rights of sover-
eignty， were righお exercisedin the context of the institutional or-
der specific to the state. Hence， these were rights which were gener-
ated th1'ough agl'eemen仁 andwhich had thei1' application only 
within the state as an in日titutionfounded in agreement. However， 
the explanation that Pufendorf gave of the matter was such that 
the sphere of the mutual co“existence ()f臼tatesand rulers， as the 
sphere of politics where internationaJ Iaw had its immediate appli-
cation， was theγe 01'the state of nature守 andhence the sphere 
of a spf;cifically natural form of society which was to be thought of 
as subsisting without support of in臼titutionsand independently of 
a1 such agreements a陪workedto establish instìtution臼 l~(i l
Given that句伝)1'Pufendorf，自tatesand their rule1's co-existed in a 
natul'al condition of自ocietvゥthenit followed that the law that was 
to servεto regulate the l'dations among states and rulers on the in由
ternational plane could not be considered to have the status of law 
that derived from agreement， or that p1'esupposed， as the condition 
for its applieation‘ institutional structures which depended 011 
agreement. In othe1' word臼， the law that was to be thought of as 
having appli.catiol1 to states and l'ulers in the Inte1'national sphere 
was nothing other than the law of nature、whichlaw stood， in 
Pufenclorfs spec.ification of it， as the law stating the fundamental 
pl'inciples ()f sむ]f-preservaLion and social order among men. Thus it 
was that when Puumdorf came to consider the status of the law of 
natIol1s， as the farm ()f int巳rnationallaw that applied to the exter-
約(;
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nal 1'elations among states and rule1's， he followed Hobbes in hold陣
ing that the law of nation臼comp1'isedthe臼amep1'inciples of natu1'al 
law which applied to individual men p1'io1' to the establishing of 
states th1'ough institutional ag1'eements. Needless to say， the p1'inci国
ples of natu1'al law that fo1'med the substance of the law of nations 
we1'e the absolute p1'inciples of natu1'al law. Fo1' in the international 
sphe1'e， as Pufendo1'f explained it， the1'e we1'e no institutions based 
in agreements holding among states and 1'ule1's， and， inconsequence 
of this， the1'e existed no institutional context p1'oviding fo1' the 
elaboration of a law of nations comp1'ising p1'inciples of natu1'al law 
with the quality of hypothetical p1'inciple白.Hence the law of nations， 
f1'om the standpoint hat Pufendo1'f adopted， was unde1'stood to com-
p1'ise the following basic p1'inciples， as drawn from the sphe1'e of ab-
solute natural law: the p1'inciples 1'elating to the right日andduties 
concerned with self-defence and self-preservation; the principles re-
lating to the duties falling on men as concerned respect fo1' the 
rights and prope1'ty of one another; the prInciples relating to the 
duties of men as concerned respect for one another in thei1' natu1'al 
equality; the p1'inciples 1'elating to the acts of benevolence and mu-
tual assistance among men which fel within the category of the 
common duties of humanity; the principle of good faith in ag1'ee-
ments， as the p1'econdition fo1' the fo1'ming of ag1'eements and fo1' 
thei1' inviolability once made. 1"7! 
ii. Pufendorf and the Fundamentals of International Law 
??? ?
The principles of natural law， as were identified by Pufendo1'f as 0 
embodying the basic substantive p1'inciples of the law of nations，自7
present themselves as p1'inciples that fo1'm a coherent legal frame同
wo1'k adequate fo1' the 1'egulation of the external relations among 
i凡i
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states and rulers in the international sphere. lndeed， the absolute 
principles of natural law that Pufendorf picked out stand， intheir 
application to states and rulers， as principles which lie at the foun-
dations of the system of modern international law. This is true， for 
example， of the principle of self-preservation that based what 
Pufendorf saw as the duties that men owed to themselves under the 
law of nature. Fo凹rthe prin児悶cipleof 白間el弘fι~p戸res倒8舵er門'Va叫tiぬon was such t出ha叫ti比t 
conferred on men the na抗tur叫 right to defend t出hems関elve倒自 i泊ntheir 
per自onand their rights， even to the extent of killing or injuring 
those who attacked or th1'桔atenedthem. The natural right of self-
defence， for Pufendorf， was an inalienable right， and if it was sub-
ject to restrictions as to its exercise by men in the condition of the 
civil state， itwas for al that a right that Pufendorf held was the 
basisおrthe security of men in the c:ondition of natural liberty 
where men co.exi自tedtogether prior to the establishing of states. As 
for state日andrulers， these were assumed by Pufendorf to co-exist 
in the natural condition of society， and so， as the1'e subject only to 
natural law，白tatesand rulel's remained entirely dependent on the 
right of self-defence fo1' their security. This right was fundamental 
for states and rul.ers in their externaJ relations in the international 
sphere， with the principle of self句defencestanding as the ba自isfor 
the exercise states of the soveTeign rights relating to the waging 
of war. Here‘Pufendorf clearly affirmed what is a foundational 
principle of modern international law，円'enin this the era of the 
United Nations， Thus it is that Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945) makes reference to the right of states to re-
sort to acts of individual or collective self-defence as an 'inherent' 
right. 
The right of self~de f(mce was not considered by Pufendorf to be 
unrestricted as to its exercise， even in the natural condition of soci樹
ety. FOT as he explained it， the right of self-defence was a right that 
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was legitimately exercised by men only when men acted to defend 
and preserve themselves in their person and in their rights and 
property. Hence the exercise of the right of self-defenc泡 was，in its 
essentials， something that Pufendorf thought of as being framed 
through the context set by the principles of natural law that related 
to the duties which men owed to one another. These were the duties 
whose observance by men was the precondition for the maintenance 
of the form of social order that， for Pufendorf， served to provide for 
the defence and preservation of men in subjection to the rule of law. 
The duties in natural law at issue here included the duties falling 
on men in regard to the respecting of the rights of one another， and 
in regard to their refraining from inflicting harm or injury on one 
another through the infringement of rights. Hence there were un-
derwritten in the law of nature the rights and duties implicit in the 
basic prohibitions relating to crimes against the person and against 
property as crimes involving the violation of rights， in addition to 
there being underwritten the rights and duties that were bound up 
with the principles governing damages， and the making of restitu-
tion to i吋町edparties， as remedial measures in respect of rights 
violations. 
There is litle difficulty in seeing how the principles of natural 
law that concern the duties falling on men to respect the rights of 
one another， and the duties to avoid harming one another though 
rights violations and to make restitution where rights are violated， 
present themselves as principles which have application to states 
and rulers in the sphere of their mutual external relations， and 
which， as such， form an integral component part of the law of na-
tions. For states and rulers are the subjects and bearers of rights， 
as is so， inthe case of states， wi出泊施 rightsrelating 加 territorial
jurisdiction and possessions and rights relating to political inde-
pendence. The respecting by states of the rights belonging to one 
?
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another on a mutual basis is plainly， as PufEmdorf implied that it 
was， a fundamental precondition for the application of the rule of 
law to state白andrulers in the society which they form together. At 
the日ametime， the infringement of the rights of states， just as 
plainly， constitutes an injury or wrong under law， and， in doing so， 
this provides precisely the sort of pretext and justification that 
Pufendorf considered was essential if there was to be legitimate re-
sort to， and exercise of， the right of self-defence as a right of war. 
Here too， then， Pufendorf affirmed principles that are intregral to 
the structure of modern international law. lndeed， the appeal that 
Pufendorf made to the law of nations as law requiring states and 
rule1's to respect the rights of one anothe1'， and to 1'ef1'ain f1'om 
1'ights violations， was an appeal that involved his looking forwa1'd to 
the development of a system of international law whe1'e the 1'ights 
of states would come to be secured th1'ough the maintenance of a le-
gal 1'egime based in wo1'kable p1'inciples of liability fo1' breaches of 
obligations relating to rights， and in workable p1'inciples of restitu-
tion fo1' the same. The development of inte1'nationallaw towa1'ds the 
1'ealization of this ideal， and with this being in broad accordance 
with the view that Pufendo1'f took of it， issomething that is rか
flected in the now cur1'ently evolving law of state 1'esponsibility. 1"91 
The requi1'ement laid on men unde1' natu1'al law that they 
should 1'espect the rights of one another， and refぬinfrom inflicting 
harm and injury， pointed directly to the equality of men as bearers 
of the rights that were defined through， and grounded in， the law of 
nature. Thus it was that Pufendorf stated that the law of nature 
imposed on men the absolute duty to 1'ecognize one another as 
equals， with this duty involving the principle that the rights and 
duties that men were subject to were to be recognized as extending 
to al men on a universal and reciprocaIly binding basis. The princi-
ple of equality and equal recognition under law stood， for Pufendorf， 
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as a fundamental presupposition of the rule of law， in the form in 
which this applied to men in the condition of the civil state. At the 
same time， the principle of equality and equal recognition under 
law was in胞ndedby Pufendorf to be taken to stand as a fundamen-
tal presupposition of the rule of law that applied in the interna-
tional sphere， asthis was based in the laws of nature in their direct 
application t刀 statesand rulers. This was so not only in the respect 
that the terms of the natural law， inits international application， 
were such that there was to be ful reciprocity in the assigning of 
rights and duties to states and rulers， but also， and more crucially， 
in the respect that the terms of the natural law were such that 
states and rulers were to be recognized as equals in their status as 
subjects of the law which applied to them. In the matter of the 
equality of states and rulers as secured to them under natural law， 
Pufendorf once more aligned himself with subsequent developments 
in international1aw. For the equality of states has come to stand as 
an essential concomitant of the sovereign independence that is as-
signed to states as the subjects of international law， and this such 
that the sovereignty and equality of states is recognized to stand as 
nothing less than the basic constitutional principle of international 
law. I開l
The absolute duties in natural law that Pufendorf saw as form幽
ing the law of nations included the categoηof the so-called common 
duties of humanity. These duties， as Pufendorf explained them， in-
volved reference to subject-matters which had a direct bearing on 
the relations between states and rulers in the international sphere， 
and on the matter of the law pertaining旬 thi日.Thu日thecommon 
duties of humanity comprehended the duties， and the rights， relat-
ing to the innocent passage of foreign goods and persons through 
state territories， the entry of foreigners into states and the granting 
of residence 加 foreignerstherein， and the establishing of general 
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ma1'kets in goods and the pu1'suit and conduct of gene1'al t1'ade and 
comme1'ce. It is in itself high!y significant that Pufendo1'f imp!ied， 
as he did， the necessity that the !aw applying in the internationa! 
sphe1'e should serve to 1'egulate t1'ading 1'elations among nations 
and states. Fo1' in implying this， he anticipated the development of 
inte1'national law in the mode1'n e1'a as a system of law that has 
p1'omoted the economic inte1'dependence of states， th1'ough p1'oviding 
fo1' the setting of comme1'cial 1'elations among states within an effec-
tive legal 1'egulato1'Y f1'amewo1'k. The last of the absolute duties in 
natu1'al law that Pufendo1'f identified was the duty of good faith 
that fel on the pa1'ties to agreements， 01' pacts. The principle of the 
faith of agreements， as Pufimdorf understood it to be an integral 
principle of the law of nations， isa p1'incip!e of law that must be 
taken to have a se!ιevident application to the relations among 
states and rulers. For the principle lies at the foundation of the !aw 
of treaties that sets and regu!ates the relations among states and 
rulers， and， as such， ithas come to 1'eceive recognition as a general 
principle of international law. Thus the principle of natural law 
stating the requirement of good faith in ag1'eements that Pufendorf 
afi1'med conforms， inits essential meaning， with the principle co任
tained in the fundamental rule of international law pactαsunt ser-
uαndα: that is， the principle that treaties are binding on the states 
that a1'e the pa1'ties to them， and are to be performed by the states 
concerned in good faith. 1'11 
The principles of natu1'al law that Pufendorf saw as embodying 
the substance of the law of nations were strictly the absolute princi-
ples of natu1'allaw， and included none with the status of hypotheti-
cal p1'inciples of natural law. For hypothetical p1'inciples of natural 
law， as Pufendorf explained them， we1'e principles that had applica咽
tion in the context of institutional structures based in the agree-
ment of men， whereas he insisted that states and rulers were to be 
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thought of as co-existing in a natural condition of society， rather 
than as bound together through their will and agreement within an 
institutional framework. Despite this， itmust be emphasized that 
the hypothetical principles of natural law that Pufendorf expounded 
were such as to have a direct bearing on the law that applied to 
states and rulers in the international sphere. The hypothetical prin-
ciples of natural law that arose consequent on the institution of lan‘ 
guage concerned duties in respect of truth-telling， and other mat-
ters， that were universal among men and that in certain contexts， 
such as the forming and the proper interpretation of agreements， 
were clearly compelling for the maintenance of law-governed rela-
tions among states and rulers. As for the hypothetical principles of 
natural law that were specific to the institution of property owner-
ship and to the exchange of values through the institution of con町
tractual agreement， these too were principles that concerned duties 
that were universal among men， and hence universal among al na-
tions and peoples. This was so even though the positive disposition 
of property ownership rights and rules of contract law remained 
something that， for Pufendorf， was determinable not on the interna-
tional plane， but only through the will of the state authorities and 
subject to the jurisdiction of the same. In the case of the hypotheti-
cal principles of natural law that Pufendorf saw as specific to the 
institution of government in the civil state， the principles in ques-
tion were of the first importance for matters relating to interna-
tional law. For these hypothetical principles of natural law served 
to define the fundamental bases of the state as a form of human as-
sociation， and， in doing so， served to define the specific attributes 
and character of states， and rulers， considered as the subjects of the 
absolute law of nature which Pufendorf took to apply to them as the 
substantive law of nations. 
The institution of the state that was explained by Pufimdorf in 
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terms of hypothetical principles of natural law was understood by 
him such that the state stood as a di日tinctlegal person with its own 
rights and property， and with a capacity for independent agency 
that w弐sexercised by the persons discharging the powers of govern-
ment specific to rulership in the state. The persons discharging gov-
ernmental powers were persons with representative status， who 
acted through the offices of rule which were defined and established 
in states in accordanee with their adopted constitutional forms. As 
for the governmental powers that were exercised as official powers， 
these， for Pufendorf， consisted in the righ胎 ofsovereignty. The 
rights essential to 日overeign主yin the state were directed to the 
maintenance of the rule of law， and related to the institutional pow-
ers that were the b即日 forJaw and legal o1'der: pa1'ticularly so the 
powers of law引lakingand adjudication， and tho日eof exeeutive en-
fo1'cement up to ilnd including the powers invoJved in the 1'ights of 
war and peace and the rights of treatie日.F1'om the standpoint of the 
natural law hypothetical to state札 the1'ights of sovereignty belong-
ing to states were such抗日 toestablish前tatesas sovereign and inde-
pendentθntite呂、 andwith the attributes approp1'iate to their having 
sovereignty and independence. Thus it was that， fo1' Pufendorf， 
states were suprcme and non-accountable， in the respect that the 
authorities that states exercised were exempt from su"Qjection to the 
will and scrutiny of al1 extemal powers 01' agencies. 
The essential form of the state that Pufendorf presented from 
the per臼pectiveof hypothetical natural law is， inits ba1'e pa1'ticulars， 
the one that has come to be assumed by the states which stand as 
the subjects of the modern system of international law. Thus for the 
pu1'poses of international law、statesare recognized， among much 
else， to bear distinct legal personality， to maintain institutions of 
self-government， touxercise sovereign rights in respect of the basic 
governmental powers essential to rulership， and to possess sove1'-
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eignty and independence on condition白suchas to exclude their sub-
ordination to powers and agencies external to themselves. That 
Pufendorf identified the defining principles of the modern state， in 
the terms that he did， isa crucial consideration in understanding 
the contribution that he made to the tradition of international law: 
as crucial a consideration， indeed， as the consideration that the 
terms of the laws of nature that he saw as applying to states and 
rulers in the international sphere served to give recognition to prin-
ciples， such as those of the right of self-defence， the equality of 
states and the faith of agreements， which stand to modern interna-
tionallaw as ranking among its foundational principles. Despite the 
recognition that Pufendorf gave to the defining principles of the in-
stitution of states， itmust be emphasized that he did not succeed in 
providing an adequate determination of international law such that 
its principles were rendered properly consistent with those specific 
to states and rulers as the subjects of this law. That this was so is 
something that should be apparent in the review that follows of the 
defects of the concept of international law that Pufendorf adopted. 
The most outstanding defect of the account that Pufendorf gave 
of international law lies in his denial of the presence of elements of 
positive law， as law based in principles of will and agreement， as an 
integral component part of the law applying to states and rulers in 
the international sphere. For Pufendorf， as for Hobbes before him， 
the law of nations consisted solely and exclusively in the principles 
of natural law in their application to states and rulers， which law 
was， by definition， law based in universal reason and law that was 
binding on states and rulers， as it was binding on individual men， 
without regard to their wil1 and agreement. Here， Pufendorf and 
Hobbes stand in sharp contrast to Grotius. To be sureヲGrotiusiden-
tified and elaborated first-order principles of natural law， such as 
those concerning self-deumce， property rights and good faith in 
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agreements， and held that these principles formed part of the law of 
war and peace as it applied both to individual men and to the rela-
tions between states and rulers. However， Grotius also held that 
the law of war and peace， in its application to states and rulers， 
comprehended the law of nations proper， with this law being posi齢
tive or voluntary law which was based in the will and consent of 
states and rulers and which， as such， was distinguishable from the 
law of nature itself. In this matter， Grotius was very much more in 
line than Hobbes and Pufendorf with respect to the underlying 
trends that were subsequently to unfold in the sphere of interna-
tional law. For modern internationallaw has developed such that it 
is recognized to incorporate within itself strong elements of positive 
law， and with the po日itivelaw applying to states and rulers being 
recognized as embodied in such principal conventional sources of 
law as the customaヴ practiceof states and the treaty agreements 
entered into by states and rulers 
The neglecting by Pufendorf of the elements of positive law per-
taining to the law applying to states and rulers underlines a more 
fundamental defect in his approach to international law， and one 
where the que日tionof the status and position of states and rulers as 
日ubjectsof international law is central. Here， once again， the con剛
trast with Grotius is instructive. For Grotius， the positive 01' volun-
tarγlaw of nations was not only law that originated in the will and 
consent of states and rulers. More strongly， the voluntary law of na-
tions was law that had specific and exclusive application to states 
and rulers as its quite particular subjects. Against this， there was 
the law of nature， which， for Grotius， was law that applied to states 
and rulers， but law that had common and indiscriminate applica-
% tion to individual men and to states and rulers， even though its ef-
fects and consequences as law for men were radically distinct from 
those for states and rulers. As with Grotius， Pufendorf saw natural 
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law as applying both to individual men and to states and rulers in 
the international sphere. However， for Pufendorf (as opposed to how 
it had been for Grotius)， there was no appeal to be made to a posi・
tive law of nations with specific and exclusive application to states 
and rulers. Thus it was that Pufendorf provided an inherently de-
fective concept of internationallaw， where the principles of interna-
tional law were left unrelated to the actual situation of states and 
rulers， and where， as a result， the juridical su倍ciencyof interna-
tional law was left fatally undermined at the level of the rights and 
duties which the law was intended to stipulate and give e貧困tto. 
The principles of natural law， as Pufendorf explained them， 
were such that， under their terms， individual men were directed to 
establish， and to subject themselves to， states and state institutions. 
This was essential， for Pufendorf， ifthe rights and duties belonging 
to men in natural law were to be rendered as perfect rights and d任
ties. For perfect rights and duties were rights and duties that were 
enforceable through the exercise of coercive power， where the power 
securing the rights and duties was relative to some institutional 
structure based in acts of will and agreement. Thus it was that it 
was the state that Pufendorf saw as serving to perfect the rights 
and duties of men， given that， as he explained it， states had estab-
lished in them the procedures relating to law-making， adjudication 
and executive authorities which provided for the proper and effec剛
tive enforcement of the rights and duties falling on men under 
naturallaw. 
1n common with the situation of individual men， the自ituation
of states and rulers， for Pufendorf， was one where states and rulers 
were subject to the absolute principles of natural law. However， 
Pufendorf stil recognized a crucial point of contrast as between the 
situation of individual men in respect of natural law and the situ-
ation of sta旬sand rulers. This was that as opposed to how it was 
? 。 。
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for individual men， there was no requirement set in natural law 
that provided that states and rulers were to subject themselves to 
some institutional authority possessing the means of coercive power 
sufficient for the enforcing of their respective rights and duties. On 
the contrary， Pufendorf insisted that states stood to one another in 
the international sphere as in a natural condition of society that 
was exclusive of al institutional frameworks based in will and 
agreement， and hence that， among states and rulers， there were 
present no hypothetical principles of natural law app1icable to the 
international sphere sufficient加 bringjuridical perfection to the 
rights and duties of states and rulers. Beyond this， of course， it
should be emphasized that the terms of the hypothetical principles 
of natural law that Pufendorf saw as specific to the institution of 
the sta胎 werethemselves such that states were to stand as sover-
eign and independent entities， and as supreme and non-accountable 
in their powers and authorities， and so in consequence of this were 
to remain free 仕omthe subjection to governmental control of the 
so此 thatwas proper to individual men within the institutional co任
text of states. 
The view that Pufendorf took of the situation of states and rul-
ers in international society was one where there was implied what 
has come to be recognized as an inherent limitation of international 
law邸 amode of legal regulation.τ'his is the absence from interna-
tionallaw， as law applying to states， of centralized sanctions to be 
imposed for non・fulfilmentof obligations， and of centralized institu-
tions of law-making， adjudication and executive enforcement 旬
maintain and give effect to the law. Even so， itmust be said that 
while Pufendorf properly recognized the limitation of international 
law， the pre日entationthat he made of this was such that he was 
drawn to make the unfortunate and unwarranted conclusion as to 
the essential imperfection， and hence the juridical insu伍ciency，of
The Tsukuba University JournaI of Law and Politics NO.32.2002 
internationa1 1aw in respect of the rights and duties to which it re-
1ated. That Pufendorf concluded this was inevitab1e， given that he 
saw states and ru1ers as bound on1y by absolute natura11aw， and as 
standing independent 仕omal institutional合ameworksestab1ished 
through will and agreement and embodying natural 1aw principles 
of the hypothetical form. However， it is this conclusion on Puferト
dorfs part that underlines his signa1 failing as regards the determi-
nation of the concept of internationa1 law. For what it is here un-
derlined is that Pufendorf failed to determine the concept of inter“ 
nationa1 law， and the princip1es of law essentia1 to the concept， in 
terms where the principles of international 1aw were taken to an曜
日werto the actua1 situation and att1'ibutes of臼tatesand 1'u1ors. but 
where the juridica1 integrity of inte1'national law was nevertheless 
vindicated and preserved and the juridical perfection of rights and 
duties at inte1'national law was p1'operly recognized and assured. 
This failing was to be avoided， and a 1101'e adequate concept of In-
ternationa1 law to be dete1'mined， inthe work of九iVolifand Vattel. 
iv. Wolff and Vattel 
Wolff and Vatte1 were the successors to Grotius， Hobbes and Pufen-
dorf in the modern secular natural1aw tradition. As such， Wolff and 
Vatte1 thought of natura1 law a日aunive1'sal law of reason that ap司
plied to men in the condition of nature which existed prio1' to the in-
stitution of political 8ociety， and thatラ indoing so， stood as a law 
that related to principles of self-preservation and to the basie princi時
ples of social o1'der whieh served to promote the end8 of self-
preservation. Hence they presented the natural lawらinits applica-
tion to the international sphereう aslaw that stated the conditions 
eondueive to the self町preservationof states， and the conditions of 80-
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cial order among states and rulers which would secure the defence 
and preservation of states and the rights and interests of states. 
Where Wolff and Vattel are to be aligned with Grotius， and to be 
set apart from Hobbes and Pufendorf， isin the respect that they 
took the law applying to the relations between states and rulers to 
comprise not only the law of nature， but also what they recognized 
to stand as the positive law of nations. As Wolff and Vattel ex暢
plained it， the sphere of the positive law of nations included the 
principles of natural law that were adapted to accord with the cir-
cumstances of state日間drulers， and in accordance with their will 
and consent. This part of the law applying to states and rulers， as 
Wolff and Vattel distinguished it， isof crucial importance in under-
standing how they transcended the sort of limitations imposed by 
Pufendorf in the determination of the concept of international law. 
For， here， Wolff and Vattel presented principles of natural law in 
application to states and rulers that， inessence， had the form and 
status of what， from Puf(mdori's standpoint， were hypothetical prirト
ciples of naturaJ law， and， in this context， natural law principles 
that were hypothetical to the condition of society specific to states 
and rulers. 
In the exposition of the elements of the law of nations that 
Wolff set out in Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractαtwn， 
there were identified four di日tinctparts of the law of nations. First， 
there was what Wolff termed the necessary law of nations: the ius 
gentium necessαrium. The necessary Iaw of nations consisted of the 
law of nature in its direct application to nations and日tates.As the 
law of nature applied direct to nations and states， the neceSSaIγlaw 
of nations was strictJy binding in conscience and， inits essence， ab-
solutely unchangeable. Hence this part of the law of nations was 
universally binding on al nations and states， inthe respect that no 
nation or state was at liberty to free itself， or any other nation or 
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state， from the obligations that the law imposed. 1621 The second part 
of the law of nations was the law that Wolff saw as deriving 合om
the necessary law of nations and hence as binding universally on al 
nations and states， but as comprising such adaptations of the ne-
cesssary law as were essential for the securing of the common inter-
ests of nations and states. This was the voluntary law of nations: 
the ius gentium voluntαrium. The third part of the law of nations 
was what Wolff called the stipulative law of nations: the ius gen-
tium pαctitium. The stipulative law of nations was the law of na-
tions as it was set through the treaties， orstipulations， agreed to by 
two or more states. The fourth pa此 ofthe law of nations was the 
customary law of nations: the ius gentium consuetudinαrium. The 
customary law of nations was the part of the law of nations that 
was established through the long usage and observance of nations 
and states. 1.印i
While the voluntary law of nations was understood by Wolff to 
derive from the necessary law of nations， and hence to be based in 
naturallaw， itremains the case that Wolff placed the voluntary law 
of nations with the stipulative and customary law as forming the 
positive law of nations: the ius gentium positivum. Thus the volun-
tary law of nations belonged to the positive law of nations in the re-
spect that it proceeded from the will of nations and states， and that 
it rested on their presumed consent. 1641 In order to explain the 
status of the voluntary law of nations as law based in natural law 
yet involving the consent of nations and states， Wolff argued that 
the source of this law， and the sphere of its application， were to be 
understood as lying in a quite particular form of association that he 
saw as obtaining among nations and自tatesin the international 
sphere. This association of states Wolff called the civitas mαximα， 
with this being presented as a supreme state of which al nations 
and states were to be counted as members or citizens. IH51 
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For Wolff， the separate nations and states were to be thought of 
as having been brought together by nature， and by their agreement， 
to constitute a single unified state， whose defining end and purpose 
lay with the promotion of the common good of the nations and 
states through the means of their combined powers. The supreme 
state so formed among the nations and states was explained by 
Wolff as possessing certain of the characteristics that belonged to 
the institution of the civil state. Thus the supreme state was under-
stood to have its own sy自民mof laws， and to possess the right and 
power of law-making. The laws specific to the supreme state were 
held to be binding on alJ nations and states， and， as such，加 besup-
ported by a general right belonging to the supreme state 加 coerce
those nations and states which failed to fulfil their obligations un-
der law. The right of coereion， sodefined， was such as to imply that 
the nation日andstates assoCiated together in the supreme state pos-
sessed a measure of collective sovereign jurisdiction over individual 
nations and states. Hence the supreme state was understood to 
have its own government， with this， for Wolff， being democratic in 
form as in accordance with the collective nature of the sovereignty 
that was vested in the supreme state and in the whole body of the 
nations and state日whichcomprised it. 161 
The supreme state was also understood by Wolff to embody the 
will of al nations and 日tate日， and to have a ruler who gave effect to 
this will. Consistent with the democratic principle basing the gov-
ernment of the supreme state， the united will of nations and states 
W倒的 beidentified through the wiIl of the majority of nations， as 
this majority will had its embodiment in the law of nations as 
adopted by the more civilized nations. As for the ruler of the SU-
preme state， his 0出cewas described by Wolff a自 concerningthe 
definition of the law which expressed the collective will of the vari-
ous nations and states. This law was binding on a1 nations and 
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states， although it was not identical in every particular with the 
law of nature. As Wolff explained it， the idea of the ruler of the su-
preme state was a fiction， and one that had to be appealed to in or-
der to account for the adaptations that had to be effected to the nec-
essary law of nations such as to render this consistent with the de-
fining purpose of the supreme state. The law that came into being 
through the adaptations made of the necessary law of nations stood 
as the voluntary law of nations.τ'hus it was that， for Wolff， the vol-
untary law of nations was law whose origins were accounted for in 
terms of the fiction of its being law laid down by the ruler of the su-
preme state， and so， as in accordance with this fiction， law that was 
understood to originate in the will of nations and states. However， 
the ultimate foundation of the voluntary law of nations lay in na-
ture， rather than in the wi1l of nations and states as such， given 
that， as Wolff insisted， itwas from the necessary law of nations 
that the voluntary law was derived. 1671 
The idea of the civitαsm似 imαwasintended by Wolff to ex-
plain not only how nations and states were to be thought of as 
bound by a system of universal law that was based in a normative 
order embodied in nature. In addition to this， the idea of the civitαs 
mαximαwas intended to explain how the universal law of nature 
binding on nations and states nevertheless required the will and 
consent of nations and states for its application， as law， tothe coル
dition of their mutual relations in the international sphere， and 
how in being so applied the law was modified to accord with the de-
fining status and attributes of nations and states. The voluntary 
law of nations was the very essence of the law that Wolff sought to 
account for by reference to the idea of the civitαsmαximα， and this 
he presented as the law of nature which was specific， inits applica-
tion， tonations and states and to their condition. Given that the 
voluntary law of nations， for Wolff， was the law of nations pe此ain-
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ing to the civitαsmαximα， this form of the law of nations must be 
seen as comprising principles of natural law law applying in the in-
temationaI sphere that remained relative， or hypothetical， toan in-
stitutional framework in the sort of respects that Pufendorf had ex-
pressly excluded from consideration. As for Vattel， however， he is 
notable for the reason that he firmly rejected the idea of the Wolfこ
fian civ#αsmαxtmαin explanation of the foundations of the law of 
nations， and， with it， the necessity of an institutional framework 
among nations and states to ground the law of nations. In doing 
this， Vattel moved even further from Pufendorf than Wolff had done 
in explaining how the law of nature gave rise to a system of the law 
of nations where principles of natural Iaw applied to， and related to， 
nations and states in accordance with their specific and defining 
status and attributes. 
The original intention of Vattel in writing Le Droit des Gens 
was to provide only a translation and popularization of Wol:f's Jus 
Gentium Methodo Scientiβcα Pertrlαctαtum. In the event， however， 
Le Droit des Gens was to become recognized in its own right as an 
authoritative statement of the public law of nations， as this was ob-
served by the European states. In the treatise， Vattel followed the 
four-part division of the elements of the law of nations that Wolff 
had adopted. First， there was the nec定ssarylaw of nations: le droit 
des gens necessaire. This comprised the law of nature in its direct 
application to nations and states， and， as such， stood as that part of 
the law of nations which was strictly binding on nations and states， 
and on rulers， asa matter of conscience. [661 Second， there was the 
voluntary Iaw of nations: le droit des gens volontaire. This for Vat-
tel， as for Wolff， was the law of nations that resulted from adapta-
tions of the law of nature， and that， as Vattel explained it， involved 
the modifications made to the strictness of the law of nature in its 
application to the actual affairs of nations and states and of rul・
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ers. 1691 Third， there was the law of treaties， or the conventional law 
of nations: le droit des gens conventionnel. 1701 Fourth， there was the 
customary law of nations， or international custom: le droit des gens 
coutumier， orla coutume des nαtions. 171 The voluntary， conventional 
and customary forms of the law of nations presupposed the consent 
and agreement of nations and states as the condition for their es-
tablishing and application， and so went together to comprise the 
sphere of the positive law of nations: le droit des gens positif 1721 
If Vattel followed Wolff in the matter of the basic division of 
the pa此sof the law of nations， he diverged markedly from his 
predecessor as to the explanation he gave of the foundation of the 
voluntary law of nations. It was in this connection that Vattel 
squarely r町jectedthe idea of the civitαsmαximα， and with it Wolft's 
implication that there might exist a supreme state in the interna-
tional sphere which possessed the sort of rights and powers specific 
to the institution of the civil state， and to which nations and states 
were to be subordinated. For Vattel， no such supreme state was 
conceivable， and this for the reason， as he emphasized in the Pref-
ace to Le Droit des Gens， that the form of association specific to the 
state was not be found obtaining among nations and states， given 
that nations and states were， and claimed to be， fully independent 
entities. 1731 
According to Vattel， the idea of the civitαsmα:Xlmαwas not 
only irreconcilable with the actual independence belonging to na旬
tions and states， but it was also quite unnecessary to follow Wolff in 
making reference to such an international governmental 仕amework
in order to explain the foundations of the voluntary law of nations. 
Instead， Vattel argued that the principles of the voluntarγlaw of 
nations were to be derived through con自iderationof the purpose and 
the general laws of the form of natural society which he saw as ex-
isting among al nations and states. For Vattel， nations and states 
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were加 bethought of as possessing the moral status and attributes 
of free and independent persons， and hence as standing to one an-
other in the same condition of mutual relationship as individual 
men stood to one another in the state of nature that preceded the 
establishing of civil society. In the natural condition of their co-
existence， nations and states， asmuch as the individuals who com-
prised them， were to be considered as the subjects of the obligations 
and rights which were embodied in the law of nature. It was this 
law， and the obligations and rights that it defined， which stood as 
the foundation both of what Vattel saw as the universal society es-
tablished by natureぉnongal men， and of what he saw as the uni-
versal society established by nature among al nations and states. 
These two forms of natural society were 1inked together through the 
law which founded them， and which served to define their respec-
tive ends. Thus it was that， for Vattel， men were united in a natu-
ral society where they were bound to assist one another to the end 
of perfecting themselves and their condition， just as nations and 
states were to be thought of as being bound to assist one another in 
the realization of their own perfection， and that of their condition， 
as the ultimate end of the natural society that they formed among 
themselves. 17，1 
Wolff had written of nations and states being bound together in 
a natural condition of society that was continuous with the society 
that nature had caused to be established among men. He had writ-
ten also of how the common good of the natural society of nations 
and states lay in the nations and states assisting one another to 
1I， promote the end of their own perおction，and that of their mutual 
condition. For Wolff， however， the ful realization of the ends essen・
106 tial to the common good of nations and states was something that 
he saw as presupposing that the separate nations and states were 
to be thought of as having passed beyond the natural form of their 
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society， through their binding themselves together in the institu-
tional form of political association embodied in the civitαs mαx-
ima. 1751 This was not the position that Vattel took. For Vattel， the 
ends of the natural society holding among nations and states were 
given in the general laws that he saw as lying at its foundations. 
These， as he explained them， were the laws whose terms were such 
as to exclude the possibility of the separate nations and states being 
thought of as subject to the authority of a supreme international 
state. The first of the general laws that Vattel presented as found-
ing the natural society of nations was that nations and states were 
to contribute to the well-being and development of other nations 
and states， tothe extent that this was in their power and consistent 
with the pursuit of their own well柵beingand development. 1761 The 
second general law a悶rmedthe natural freedom and independence 
of nations and states， and provided that the nations and states were 
加 exercisetheir natural liberty under conditions of peace and to re-
spect the rights that belonged to one another by nature. 171 As a fur-
ther general law of the natural society of nations and states， there 
was the principle of the equality of nations and states. Here， Vattel 
emphasized that just as individual men were equals by nature and 
with the same naturally sanctioned obligations and rights， so also 
were nations and states， considered as free persons or entities co・
ほ istingin the state of nature， tobe recognized as equals by nature 
and as holding from nature the same obligations and the same 
rights. 1781 
For Vattel， then， the natural society obtaining among nations 
and states was a form of society based in general laws which 
worked to confirm and secure the企eedom，independence and equal-
ity of nations and states. It was the principle that nations and 
states were free， independent and equal that formed the basis for 
the deriving of the modifications to the strictness of the naturallaw， 
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which modifications Vattel saw as being required for the establish-
ing of a system of law conducive to the regulation of the relations 
among nations in the actual condition of their mutual society in the 
intemational sphere. In other words， itwas the natural society of 
the nations and states as such， presented as a society of free， inde-
pendent and equal nations， that stood as the foundation for the vol-
untary law of nations. For in the explanation that Vattel provided 
of it， the voluntary law of nations was essentially the law of nature 
modified to form rules and principles that accorded with， and gave 
effect to， the general laws which provided that the perfection of na-
tions， and the perfection of their condition， demanded their continu-
ous contribution to the well-being and dEwelopment of one another， 
together with the preservation of their mutual freedom， independ-
ence and equality. 
The explanation that Vattel gave as to how the voluntary law 
of nations derived仕omnatural law was crucially bound up with his 
appeal to a c1assification of different types of obligations and rights， 
and one that was based in the distinction， such as Pufendorf had 
drawn， asbetween perfect obligations and rights and imperfect obli-
gations and rights. According to Vattel， obligations were either in-
temal obligations or extemal obligations. Thus obligations were in・
temal when they were binding on men in conscience， and were de-
rived from rule自andprinciples setting out the basic duties of men 
under natural law. Extemal obligations were obligations that gave 
rise to rights which were held by other men. For Vattel， the cate-
gory of extemal obligations was divided in加 perfectobligations and 
imperfect obligations， with the rights to which these gave rise being 
divided into perfect rights and imperfect rights. In this closely fol・
lowing the analytical schematization of obligations and rights set 
out by Pufendorf， Vattel maintained that perfect rights were rights 
where there was present a right to compel the performance of the 
The Tsukuba University Journal ofLaw and Politics No.32.2002 
obligations to which they corresponded. Imperfect rights were rights 
whose corresponding obligations were not capable of being enforced 
in this way. Perfect obligations were obligations where there existed 
a right to enforce the fulfilment of their terms. Imperfect obligations， 
by contrast， were obligations where there exist泡dno right of en嗣
forcement as such in respect of their subjects， but only a right to re-
quest that the terms of the obligations should be fulfilled. 1791 
This classification of obligations and rights related to the mat-
ter of the voluntary law of nations as law deriving from natural law 
as follows. From the standpoint of the voluntary law of nations， 
Vattel argued， the separa旬 nationsand states were not as such ac-
countable to one another for the intrinsic justice of their conduct， as
this was to be determined through consideration of what was owed 
in strict conscience under the law of nature. This was so， for Vattel， 
for the reason that nations and states were to be thought of as be-
ing at liberty to decide for themselves what was required of them in 
conscIence in the discharging of their natural obligations， and， in 
consequence of this， tobe thought of also as possessing a perfect 
equality in rights in respect of one another and in the context of 
their mutual relations. Vattel accepted that the liberty of nations 
and states remained limited， but only in the regard也atnations 
and states were accountable to one another for violations of those of 
their obligations and rights which were perfect external obligations 
and rights， and which， as such， were enforceable as between their 
bearers. As Vattel explained it， then， the voluntary law of nations 
did not pertain to the law of nature in its entirety. It pertained only 
to the obligations and rights of nations and states that were exter-
nal and perfect obligations and rights， and whose enforcement as 
obligations and rights remained consistent with the liberty and 
equality which belonged to nations and states by nature. As for the 
justification for the voluntary law of nations and the various modifi-
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cations of naturallaw that it involved， this Vattel saw as something 
that was to be found based in the consideration that the means of 
force and coercion were not to be used by， and against， nations and 
states in such a way as to undermine their natural freedom， inde-
pendence and equality. It was to this voluntary law that the nations 
and states were to be presumed to have consented， as a complex 
body of rules and principles whose observance by nations and states 
stood as a precondition for the realization of the ends of the natural 
日ocietythat they formed together. 1州
The view of the lawアapplyingto nations and states as the natu同
ral law modified， so as to aeむordwith the freedom， independence 
and equality belonging to nations and states， isone that is to be 
found ever戸町hereinforming the円tatementthat Vattel provided of 
the substantive law of nations in Le Droit des Gens. Of crucial con-
cern， inthis connection， are those subject-matters of the law of na-
tions where Vattel distingui日hedbetween the relevant principles 
given in the necessary law of nations and the relevant principles 
given in the voluntary law of nations， and， indoing so， underlined 
that it was the voluntary law that embodied the law which had ap由
plication to nations and states in their actual condition and circum-
stances. Thi日wassoぅforexample， with respect to Vattel's treatment 
of the law of nation白asit related to commerce among nations， and 
also with respect to much of his treatment of the law of war. 181 
1n the explanation that Vattel gave of the i日sueof international 
commerce， the separate nations and states were assumed to be 
seized of a fundamental right， and to be subject to a fundamental 
duty， toengage in eommerce for the securing of that which satisfied 
their mutual needs and interests. As for the foundation of the right 
and duty of nations and states to engage in commerce， this was un飾
derstood to be given directly in the law of nature. However， the 
rights and duties bound Up with commercial exchange among na幽
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tions and states， such as were grounded directly in natural law， 
were imperfect rights and duties， and hence rights and duties which 
were not capable of being enforced as between nations and states. 
This was so because， as Vattel emphasized， itfollowed from the 
natural libe此ybelonging to nations and states that the nations and 
states were to be 仕eeto determine for themselves whether， and if 
so to what extent and on what conditions， they would enter in旬
commercial relations with one another， and to be free to determine 
this in accordance with proper judgments conceming their general 
security and advantage. The freedom of the nations and states to 
set the terms of their trade and commerce with one another in the 
intemational sphere was， for Vattel， the fundamental principle of 
the voluntary law of nations as it served to define the law of com圃
merce. Hence it was provided for in the voluntary law of nations， as
distinct from the necessary law of nations， that commerce among 
nations and states was to be made subject to the law of treaties， 
and with this having the consequence that commercial rights and 
duties as between nations and states were to be considered perfect， 
and so enforceable， only where these were based in treaty agree帽
ments entered into by specific consenting nations and states and 
thereby given the force and status of conventionallaw. Thus it was 
that Vattel saw the principle of freedom of commerce among nations 
and states as a principle based in natural law， yet as a principle 
that had application to nations and states only within the context of 
a system of voluntary law which worked to enshrine， and to give ef-
fect to， the freedom， independence and equality of the separate na-
tions and states. 1821 
As regards the law of nations as it concerned the waging of war， 
人
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Vattel saw the law of nature， as this formed the necessary law of 111 
nations， as grounding the fundamental right of nations and states 
to wage war in defence of their rights and as restricting the occa-
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sions for the permissible exercise of the right to those where con-
ventional just cause for war existed. However， itremains the case 
that while Vat胞1based the right of war in the law of nature， he 
stil nevertheless insisted that it was not open to nations and states 
to act to enforce the terms of the law of nature against one another 
in al its rigour. On the contrary， he emphasized that when nations 
and states resorted to war， itwas required of them that they should 
conform with such rules and principles based in， or pertaining to， 
the sphere of the voluntary law of nations as worked初 preservean 
equality of rights as between bel1igerents. One consequence of this， 
for Vattel， was that while the necessary law of nations was such 
that， from the standpoint that it a妊orded，no war between different 
nations and states Was properly to be considered just on both sides， 
the voluntary law of nations was such that it provided that wars be-
tween nations and states were properly to be considered just on 
both sides with regard to the legal effects of war. Accordingly， it
stood as a rule of war pertaining to the voluntary law of nations 
that whatever means of war were held to be permitted to belliger-
ent nations and states were also to be held as permitted to al bel-
ligerents on an equal basis， and without condition as to the intrinsic 
justice of cause. Thus did the voluntary law of nations involve modi-
fication of the principles of the law of war as出emeans for enforc-
ing the rights of nations and states that the law of nature under-
wrote， and with this so a自toreflect and to give effect to the veIγ 
equality among nations and states which stood as the fundamental 
principle of natural law in its application to nations and states. I回 l
As it will be clear from this， the voluntary law of nations， for 
Vattel， was the law of nature in its application to nations and states 
which were recognized to stand as free， independent and equal enti-
ties. Hence the voluntaIγlaw of nations was law that gave recogni-
tion to， and that served to regulate， nations and states in their 
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status as sovereign nations and states. This was so for the reason 
that the freedom， independence and equality that Vattel saw as be-
longing to nations and states， and as determining the modifications 
to natural law such as went to form the voluntary law of nations， 
were in themselves the essential aspects of the sovereignty that he 
insisted was held and exercised by nations and states as subjects of 
the law of nations. I制l
It is the emphasis that Vattel placed on the sovereignty and in樹
dependence of nations and states， as the subjects of the law of na-
tions， that marks him off仕omWolff， as is evident， most particu-
larly， with his explicit rejection of the Wol伍anideal of the civit，αs 
maximα. For， here， Vattel insisted that the sovereign independence 
of nations and states was such that nations and states were to re-
main exempt from subjection to external political authority， and 
that this exemption was something that was implicit in the very 
terms of the law which applied to nations and states and which 
served to give juridical definition to their sovereignty and independ-
ence. In this matter， Vattel closely followed Pufendorf. For Pufen-
dorf， ofcourse， saw nations and states as exempt from external po・
litical authority in such respects as their being supreme and non-
accountable， just as he held， as Vattel did a氏erhim， that nations 
and states were free， independent and equal， and hence sovereign， 
under the terms of the law of nature which applied to them. How晦
ever， and to repeat this， itmust be said that Pufendorf presented 
nations and states as sovereign in terms such that nations and 
states stood to one another in the international sphere in strict sub同
jection to the absolute principles of natural law， but not in mutual 
association within an institutional framework based in consent and 
agreement where the law applying to them was hypothetical in 
form and hence sufficient to confer juridical perfection on the sub-
stantive rights and duties which the law stipulated. In contrast to 
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Pufendorf， Vattel was prepared to recognize the presence of an in-
stitutional f旨ameworkas setting the context for the co-existence of 
nations and states in the internationaI sphere. The framework con-
cerned was not a political-institutional structure analogous to the 
Wolffian ciuitαs mαximα， but was instead the 仕ameworkset 
through the laws that applied to nations and states in what Vattel 
presented as being the condition of the natural form of their mutual 
society. This 仕ameworkwas the one comprising the voluntary law 
of nations， which fI'amework was institutional in its being based in 
the consent and agreement of nations and states， and which， in be-
ing so instituted， provided for the perfecting of the rights and duties 
of nations and states arising from the principles of naturallaw. 
The determination that Vattel made of the voluntary law of na-
tions does not only serve to mark him off from Pufendorf， and to 
point to his superiority in elaborating the concept of international 
law as in relation to his predecessor. In addition， the appeal that 
Vattel made to the idea of the voluntary law of nations serves to 
underline that which is most distinctive about his contribution to 
the development of the concept of international Iaw， in his status as 
a modern seculal' natural law thinker. Here， itmust be emphasized 
that with his appeal to the voluntary law of nations， Vattel followed 
Grotius， Hobbes and Pufendorf in affirming that the law of nature 
stood as the foundation for the law applying to nations and states 
in the sphere of their mutual external relations， and hence that it 
was the natural law that comprised the fundamental substantive 
principles of the law of nations. At the same， however， the idea of 
the voluntary law of nations was such that， through appeal to it， 
Vattel was able to expound the principles of naturallaw as modified 
through the form of their application to nations and states. This， of 
course， meant in its turn that he was able to identify and expound 
the principles of natural law that were specific to nations and states 
??
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and to their condition， as distinct from the principles of natural law 
that had application to individual men in the condition of society 
obtaining prior to， and independently of， the forming of nations and 
states.τ'hus it was that in exposition of the law of nations， Vattel 
looked beyond the undi任erentiatednatural law principles， such as 
self-defence， good faith， and equality and equal recognition， to 
which Hobbes and Pufendorf had restricted themselves. Thus it was 
also that， in looking beyond the limits of undifferentiated natural 
law principles， Vattel served to carry forward the enterprise of 
Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pacis through constructing a compre-
hensive doctrine of international law that， in accordance with the 
conception of the voluntary law of nations， made reference to al the 
basic substantive elements of the law of nations as the law pertain-
ing to states and rulers. 1851 
Conclusion 
The exposition that Vattel provided of the elements of the law of 
nations in Le Droit des Gens marks出eculmination of the modern 
tradition of secular natural law theorizing， as this was directed to 
the elaboration of the concept of international law. In contrast to 
Vattel and his exposition of the law of nations， the specification that 
Pufendorf gave of the elements of the law of nations remained seri-
ously deficient， and this for the reasons that are set out in the pre-
sent paper. Thus Pufendorf failed to elaborate principles of natural 
law that would do ful duty as a system of the law of nations， given 
that the principles that he identified were not modified so as to 
have application to states and rulers as the subjects of the law in 
their actual condition and circumstances. So also， and in conse咽
quence of this failing， Pufendorf failed signally to confirm the juridi幡
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cal perfection of the rights and duties that were embodied in the 
substance of the law that he saw as applying to states and rulers in 
the sphere of int泡rnationalsociety. Despite the deficiencies of 
Pufendorf on the law of nations， itremains the case that the natu-
ral law jurisprudence that he systematized served to set the under-
lying conceptual framework which was to be adopted by Vattel in 
exposition of the law of nations. It is likewise the case， as it is in-
sisted on in this paper， that the principles of natural law that 
Pufendorf identified as the substance of the law of nations rank 
among the defining・andfundamental principles that are present 
within what has come to be accepted as the prevailing concept of in-
ternational law. That this is so underlines the commitment of 
Pufendorf to the ideals set for international law which are so dis-
tinctive to the modern secular natural law tradition as initiated by 
Grotius and Hobbes. 
The idealism of the secular natural law thinkers in regard to 
internationallaw is ref1ected， most particularly， intwo fimdamental 
claims that the thinkers made concerning the concept of law as 
such. First， there is the claim of the natural law thinkers as to the 
essential unity of the spheres of law and morals， with this being the 
claim that the law incorporated， and contained， within itself certain 
first-order principles of justice and political lllorality. The unity of 
law and lllorals was a core claim of the secular natural law thinkers， 
and one that， in respect of internationaI law， was ever戸IVhereap-
pealed to by Grotius， Hobbes， Puf(mdorf， Wolff and Vattel in their 
insistence that the principles of naturallaw， asthese comprised the 
first-order principles of justice and political lllorality， were princi-
ples of law which had a direct application to states and rulers in the 
sphere of their mutual relations. Thus it was that the principles of 
selιdefence， good faith in agreements and equality and equal recog司
nition， as principles of justice and political morality enshrined in 
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naturallaw， were affirmed as integral component pa此sof the law 
which was to set the basic terms of the relations among states and 
rulers in the intemational sphere. 
The second of the key jurisprudential claims of the secular 
natural law thinkers that stands out is the claim that the principles 
of justice and political morality， as contained within law， were prirト
ciples that possessed the objective validity， and universal applica-
tion， appropriate to them as principles of natural law and that， as 
such， embodied laws which were to be thought of as being based in 
the order of nature itself. It was very much in these terms that the 
secular natural law thinkers held that the principles of justice and 
political morality pertaining to natural law formed a sphere of law 
that possessed a normative status， and a binding normative白rce，
which were such as to serve to distinguish it from the sphere of 
positive law， where law was understood 旬 begenerated through de-
cisive acts of will， consent and agreement. The distinction drawn be-
tween the spheres of natural law and positive law was critical as rか
gards位leelaboration of the concept of internationallaw. For in the 
drawing of it， the secular natural law thinkers were able to affirm 
that the law of nations incorporated， as pa此 ofitself， rules and 
principles of conduct that， as rules and principles comprising the 
laws of nature， were distinct from the parts of the positive law of 
nations which were based in sources where the will， consent and 
agreement of states and rulers were actively engaged and involved. 
Thus it was that the general principles of justice and political mo・
rality belonging to the law of nations， aspart of natural law， were 
recognized to be distinct from the law deriving from the customary 
practice of states and企omthe treaty stipulations of states and rul-
ers. 80 also were the general principles of justice and political mo・
rality pertaining to natural law recognized to have direct and bind“ 
ing application to sta飴sand rulers without regard to the perform醐
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ance of acts establishing their consent and agreement to be bound， 
such as would be presupposed for the obligations of states and rul-
ers under customary law and treaties. 
Following Vattel， the principles essential to the modern secular 
natural law tradition in jurisprudence were challenged， and the ba-
sic claims as regards law advanced within the tradition brought 
into question， with the emergence of successor schools in legal and 
political thought. The undermining of the secular natural law tradi-
tion extended to the bringing into question of the principal claims 
made by the secular natural law thinkers as regards the formal ju-
ridical status and normative authority of international law. This 
was so， not least， in respect of the two philosophers who， as they 
wrote during the final decades of the eighteenth century， were to be 
central in the rejection of the natural law standpoint in jurispru-
dence. The first of these was the German philosopher Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804). In relation to the matter of the tradition of secu-
lar natural law theorizing， Kant is especially notable given that， in
the context of discussion of the law of nations， he quite expressly re-
pudiated the doctrines of Grotius， Pufendorf and Vattel. In doing 
this， he was led to insist， in opposition to the view of the earlier 
natural law theorists， that the law of nations would have to be 
founded， and its binding normative force validated， not by reference 
旬 antecedentprinciples of law that were assumed to be given in the 
order of nature， but rather through reference to the acts of will and 
agreement of the states which were by means of such acts to be 
bound by law. This was the essential meaning of the claim that the 
law of nations was to be founded in the voluntarγparticipation by 
states in a formal treaty agreement for the establishing among 
118 themselves of a constitutional federation of states， which claim 
Kant famously advanced in his treatise Perpetual Peαce (1795). I描l
The second philosopher to be reckoned with here， inthe matter 
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of the repudiation of the secular naturallaw tradition， was the Eng-
lish legal and political theorist Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). For 
Bentham it was who initiated the classic positivist tradition in 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. The positivist jurisprudence that Ben-
tham constructed was one where， indirect opposition to the natural 
law standpoint， the sphere of law was presented as being formally 
distinct from the sphere of justice and morals. As for the analysis of 
law that Bentham provided， this was an analy日iswhere law was ex-
plained as being founded not in a normative order embodied in na-
ture， but in the decisive acts of will of its author， and where the 
rule of law， as this was maintained in the state， was explained as 
being essentially the rule of positive law and， as such， as compris-
ing commands and prohibitions which issued from the wil1 and 
authority of the sovereign possessing the legislative power. The 
terms of this the so四calledimperative analysis of law were deeply 
subversive of the ideal of international law: for if law proper was 
positive law and positive law was based in the will of sovereigns， 
then it followed by implication that international law was improp-
erly to be thought of as law， given that the sphere of international 
society knew of no sovereign authorities through whose wil1 an 
authentic rule of law based in explicit commands and prohibitions 
might be established. This implication was to be drawn out later by 
the distinguished disciple of Bentham， the English jurist John 
Austin (1790-1859)， who held that positive law proper consisted of 
commands issued by sovereigns and supported by coercive sanctions， 
and that， in consequence of this， international law was to be 
thought of as pertaining not to the sphere of positive law， but to the 
sphere of what he called positive morality. Thus it was that Austin 
affirmed the claims of justice and morality for the realm of interna-
tional politics， but only at the great cost of denying the status of 
law to the rules and principles by which justice and morality in the 
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international realm were to be defined， and so through this estab-
lishing with his positivist jurisprudence， and in counteraction to the 
idealism of the secular natural law thinkers， the final and absolute 
dissociation of the sphere of international morals from that of inter暢
nationallaw. 1871 
The general philosophical context for the jurisprudence relating 
to the international law of the contemporary era is one that， toa 
very large extent， has been established and set by the traditions in 
legal and political thought to whose emergence thinkers like Kant 
and Bentham so decisively contributed. However， itmust be empha-
sized that present internatioual law is not amenable to full and adか
quate explanation in accordance with the voluntarist and positivist 
assumptions that inform the view of law argued for by Kant and 
Bentham， but， rather， that international law in certain of its as-
pects demands explanation from a jurisprudential standpoint closer 
to the one adopted by the secular natural law thinkers. In this con-
nection， there is everything to be said about the body of rules and 
principles that form the now developing law of international human 
rights‘For these are rules and principles where， in defiance of posi帽
tivist dogma， the law plainly incorporates within itself firstωorder 
principles of justice and political morality at the level of substantive 
law and at the level of the interpretation and application of sub-
stantive law. There is also everything to be said， here， about what 
is now the acceptance as an authoritative source for international 
law of general principles of law whose binding normative force for 
states is recognized to be independent of their own will and agree-
ment to be bound， and where the general principles of law con-
cerned are accepted as being formally distinct from the sources of 
internationallaw embodied in state custom and state treaties which 
presuppose the wiIl and agreement of states as the condition for 
their emergence and application. The general principles that are ac幽
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knowledged to stand as the norトvoluntaryprinciples of interna-
tionallaw include principles， such as reciprocity among states in re-
spect of rights and duties， the equality and equal recognition of 
states， and good faith in international agreements， that were identi-
fied and affirmed by the secular natural law thinkers as fundamen-
tal principles of the law of nations which remained distinct from the 
sphere of positive law. That this is so should serve to confirm the 
abiding relevance of the work of the secular natural law thinkers in 
the understanding of modern international law， and， in line with 
what is argued in the present paper， toconfirm also the proper cre-
dentials of Pufendorf as a leading secular natural law thinker for a 
place within the tradition of modern internationallaw. 181 
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